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Reckoning with Race and Disability 
Jasmine E. Harris 
abstract.  Our national reckoning with race and inequality must include disability. Race and 
disability have a complicated but interconnected history. Yet discussions of our most salient socio-
political issues such as police violence, prison abolition, healthcare, poverty, and education con-
tinue to treat race and disability as distinct, largely biologically based distinctions justifying differ-
ential treatment in law and policy. This approach has ignored the ways in which states have relied 
on disability as a tool of subordination, leading to the invisibility of disabled people of color in civil 
rights movements and an incomplete theoretical and remedial framework for contemporary justice 
initiatives. Legal scholars approach the analysis of race and disability principally as a matter of 
comparative subordination (race and disability; race as disability; disability as race). More recent 
scholarship, however, incorporates critical race and intersectionality to identify connections and 
center those most marginalized within racial justice and disability rights movements. This body 
of emerging legal scholarship creates fruitful points of entry, but still situates disability as an ana-
lytical tool for understanding racial subordination without due attention to disability’s co-consti-
tutive function and its remedial lessons. 
 This Essay argues that aesthetic theories of disability discrimination offer a comprehensive, 
unifying lens to understand the roots of both race and disability discrimination, the nature of the 
harms experienced by those with intersectional identities, and, perhaps most useful, the construc-
tion of remedies that can meaningfully address the endemic aesthetic origins of inequality. First, 
an aesthetics lens shows how deeply rooted biases mark people of color with and without disabil-
ities as deviant, incompetent, and unequal. These biases trigger affective responses that, at first 
blush, appear to be biological and visceral when, in fact, they are products of centuries of structural 
subordination. Second, aesthetics help explain why norms of race and disability together are es-
pecially resistant to change. Third, aesthetic theories surface a misplaced faith in the quintessential 
socio-legal prescription for inequality: training and education. While such interventions may be 
necessary, this Essay cautions against their remedial sufficiency and calls for training and education 
designed with due attention to the lessons of aesthetics. 
introduction 
Reginald Latson, known as “Neli,” sat in the grass in front of his local public 
library in Stafford County, Virginia, waiting for the building to open. While he 
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waited, a “concerned citizen” called the local police department about a suspi-
cious person with a “hoodie” perhaps “with a gun” who was “loitering outside 
the library.”1 Latson, an unarmed eighteen-year-old, had done nothing illegal.2 
When the police officer arrived and ask him his name, he did not answer. In-
stead, believing he was in danger, Latson “responded with a ‘fight or flight’ re-
action.”3 The officer arrested Latson and the Commonwealth of Virginia charged 
him with felony assault on a law-enforcement officer, for which he received a 
sentence of more than ten years in prison.4 
The prosecutor gave short shrift to claims that the charges and noncompliant 
behaviors documented by the officer were manifestations of Latson’s autism, 
preferring to frame disability as a “convenience.”5 In Virginia, Stamper v. Com-
monwealth precluded Latson’s lawyer from presenting evidence of Latson’s disa-
bilities—lay or expert testimony, documentary testimony, all prohibited—to 
contextualize the facts presented at Latson’s bail hearing and criminal trial.6 Fur-
thermore, while detained, the corrections officers also declined to acknowledge 
 
1. Ruth Marcus, Ruth Marcus: In Virginia, a Cruel and Unusual Punishment for Autism, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-in-virginia 
-a-cruel-and-unusual-punishmentfor-autism/2014/11/14/9d7f6108-6c3b-11e4-b053-65cea79 
03f2e_story.html [https://perma.cc/N4G7-6KXW]; Theresa Vargas, Remember Neli Latson, 
the Black Teen with Autism Who Seemed ‘Suspicious’ Sitting Outside a Library? Ten Years After His 




ing how the incident and his incarceration continue to affect Latson). 
2. Letter from Lamont Bagby, Virginia Delegate, et al., to Ralph Northam, Governor, Virginia 
& Kelly Thomasson, Sec’y of Commonwealth (July 7, 2020) [hereinafter Northam Letter], 
https://www.centerforpublicrep.org/wp-content/uploads/Letter-to-Governor-Northam 
-Re-Neli-Latson-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/VND4-QNTA]. 
3. Id. at 1-2. Evidence of flight (broadly defined) is admissible in court as circumstantial evidence 
of guilt; the fact finder must make the following inferential leaps: Latson’s behavior to his 
attempts to flee; from his attempts to flee to consciousness of Latson’s guilt; from conscious-
ness of Latson’s guilt to “consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged” in the case; and 
from Latson’s “consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged” to his “actual guilt of the 
crime charged.” United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added). 
But see Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evidence, 101 MINN. L. REV. 
2243, 2269-70 (2017) (arguing that courts assume evidence of flight to be relevant, and noting 
that “[w]here people of color flee from police, a critical race inquiry reveals structural racial 
bias entrenched in the evidentiary doctrine of flight”). 
4. Northam Letter, supra note 2, at 2. 
5. Id. 
6. 324 S.E.2d 682, 688 (Va. 1985) (holding that “evidence of a criminal defendant’s mental state 
at the time of the offense is, in the absence of an insanity defense, irrelevant to the issue of 
guilt”). 
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Latson’s disabilities and denied him necessary accommodations.7 Officers sub-
jected Latson to prolonged restraints and seclusion; for example, he spent 182 
out of a total of 243 days (approximately eight months) in solitary confinement 
for up to twenty-four hours per day.8 
Neli Latson is a Black, autistic man.9 How do we make sense of the role of 
race10 and disability11 in the discrimination experienced by Neli? This Essay ar-
gues that current comparative and intersectional lenses offer an incomplete pic-
ture of the nature of the harm and how best address it. While intersectionality12 
certainly captures Neli Latson’s experience by shifting the focal point of analysis 
to the cross-sections of race and disability (Neli’s experience as a Black, autistic 
man),13 it does less work as a diagnostic and prescriptive lens. In other words, 
intersectionality tells us to focus on all identities and how they come together to 
 
7. Northam Letter, supra note 2, at 2. 
8. Id. at 2; see also Brief Amici Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of Plain-
tiff-Appellant and Reversal at 6-8, Latson v. Clarke, No. 1:16-cv-0039 (W.D. Va. Feb. 11, 
2019) (describing the conditions of Latson’s confinement including almost complete isolation 
and deprivation of access to sensory stimuli, basic hygiene products, and regular nutrition). 
9. Northam Letter, supra note 2, at 1. This Essay moves between person first language and iden-
tity first language to illustrate the current conversations taking place in disability communities 
about self-identification and the role of the impairment in identity. People’s First/Person First 
language came out of the self-advocates’ movement primarily among people with intellectual 
and developmental disabilities. Identity First language is a more contemporary move to rec-
ognize the importance of disability in their identity and move from person with autism, for 
example, to autistic or autistic person. See Lydia X.Z. Brown, The Significance of Semantics: 
Person-First Language: Why It Matters, AUTISTIC HOYA (Aug. 4, 2011), https://www 
.autistichoya.com/2011/08/significance-of-semantics-person-first.html [https://perma.cc 
/TB5L-VS7W]. 
10. This Essay primarily discusses the relationship between “blackness” and disability. I recognize 
that the experiences of other historically marginalized groups are important and may be dif-
ferent. In future work, I will explore these different relationships with disability, for example, 
constructions of disability in Latinx communities and law’s role in that construction. 
11. I adopt a broad socio-legal definition of disability informed but not limited by the federal 
definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act: a person with a disability is 
one who has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits” their lives in some 
way. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2018). 
12. Intersectionality brings a degree of vagueness as to what it is exactly. Is it theory, perspective, 
methodology, or a general perspective by which to view the world? It can be all of the above 
though such nuances matter to how we think about its application and whether it can produce 
plausible remedies in law and society. 
13. Gender also plays an important role here but will not be addressed in depth; however, given 
its intimate connection to other axes of subordination, I will briefly offer some thoughts. The 
fact that Neli is a Black autistic male triggers particular aesthetic and emotional responses in 
the aggregate. See Jasmine E. Harris, The Aesthetics of Disability, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 895 
(2020) (constructing a theory of the “aesthetics of disability” as a more comprehensive way 
to understand the deep aesthetic and emotional roots of disability discrimination in society). 
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form a distinct, new type of experience of discrimination. But it does not, in the 
case of race and disability, tell us about the source of intersectional marginaliza-
tion or the tension between identity labels in communities of color—all neces-
sary insights to help design more accurate legal remedies. 
Aesthetic theories of discrimination, this Essay contends, can supplement the 
vagaries surrounding intersectionality as an analytical lens to understand race 
and disability.14 First, an aesthetics lens shows how deeply rooted biases mark 
people of color with and without disabilities as deviant, incompetent, and une-
qual. These biases trigger affective responses that, at first blush, appear to be 
biological and visceral when, in fact, they are the product of centuries of struc-
tural subordination. Second, aesthetics help explain why norms of race and dis-
ability together are especially resistant to change. Third, aesthetic theories sur-
face a misplaced faith in training and education as a prescription for inequality, 
particularly in the context of the criminal-justice system. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I offers a descriptive account of the 
existing legal scholarship15 on race and disability. Part II then uses the opening 
example of Neli Latson to explain what is missing from the current scholarship. 
Part III argues that aesthetic and affective theories of discrimination offer a uni-
fying lens that further develops the meaning of intersectionality in the context 
of race and disability. I then apply an aesthetic lens to Neli Latson’s case to begin 
to build a broader remedial framework for intersectional discrimination.16 I con-
clude with a few questions to consider as legal scholars continue to cultivate crit-
ical disability frameworks in law. 
 
14. Aesthetic theories concern what we see as beautiful and pleasurable. I am interested in how 
we render aesthetic judgments and how these assessments influence human behavior and 
proclivity to discriminate against those bearing non-normative markers of beauty. See, e.g., 
Dominic Mciver Lopes, Aesthetic Experts, Guides to Value, 73 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 
235, 237 (2015) (“Aesthetic evaluations are . . . dispositional states of mind attributing aes-
thetic merits or demerits . . . . [T]he agent attributes aesthetic values to the object of the act, 
so that, were different values attributed to the object, then the act would have gone differ-
ently.”). My work most closely aligns with aesthetics scholars thinking about “body aesthet-
ics”—how we evaluate and respond to certain physical, behavioral, and auditory markers of 
difference—as sources of socio-political oppression. See, e.g., Sherri Irvin, Introduction: Why 
Body Aesthetics, in BODY AESTHETICS 1-10 (2016) (“Aesthetic standards thus serve a discipli-
nary function, maintaining oppressive norms of race, gender, and sexuality.”). See generally 
Harris, supra note 13. 
15. I include some disability-justice work in here as well because, while the authors are not legal 
scholars, they analyze critical disability legal issues and belong in this group. 
16. Part III sets up future work in this area. 
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i .  survey of legal scholarship on race and disability 
In 2010, Beth Ribet reviewed existing scholarship on race and disability.17 
She argued that disability scholarship required greater theorizing about inter-
sectionality and association with critical race studies (CRS) and that “[r]elatively 
few” CRS scholars have incorporated disability into their scholarship.18 Part I 
primarily builds upon Ribet’s discussion of scholarship. It picks up where her 
analysis left off to capture more recent scholarly conversations that respond to 
the past decade’s transformative movements.19 
 
17. Beth Ribet, Surfacing Disability Through a Critical Race Theoretical Paradigm, 2 GEO. J. L. & 
MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 209, 209 (2010). Her review was not limited to legal scholarship 
and engaged with a broader swarth of interdisciplinary scholarship. See, e.g., id. at 213-14 (dis-
cussing the work in this area by Douglas Baynton, Susan Schweik, and Gregory Michael 
Dorr). 
18. Id. 
19. I frame scholars and scholarship broadly considering the roadmaps to the papers and overall 
methodology. As a result, the list of scholars is not exhaustive but illustrative and meant to 
open the conversation on what scholarship already exists, its limitations, and identity holes 
not explored. Contemporary civil-rights movements have emerged since 2010 including the 
expansion of United We Dream (DREAMers), Black Lives Matter, a resurgence of feminism 
including the “fourth wave” that surfaced in 2012, the Women’s marches, and MeToo. See, e.g., 
Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Move-
ment in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020 
/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/5QHC-WFUL] (call-
ing the Black Lives Matter Movement’s protests after George Floyd’s death the largest social 
movement in U.S. history with somewhere between 15 and 26 million participants over the 
course of a short period of time in about 4,700 protests nationwide); id. (comparing the Black 
Lives Matter protests to the Women’s March on Washington in 2017 that had between three 
and five million people); id. (noting that the civil-rights marches in the 1960s were “consid-
erably smaller in number” such that if you add up all of the marches the numbers of people 
are a few hundred thousand); see also Bonnie Chiu, 2020s Mark a New Wave of Feminist Mobi-
lization, FORBES (Mar. 8, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bonniechiu/2020/03/08 
/2020s-mark-a-new-wave-of-feminist-mobilization/?sh=378558de485e [https://perma.cc 
/AD6V-PRSV] (discussing the rise of new forms of feminist activism and organizing to be 
both “intersectional and intergenerational”). The past decade brought Donald Trump to the 
White House and with it visible conservative and white-supremacy movements, culminating 
in the riots at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. See, e.g., Walter J. Nicholls & Tara Fiorito, Dream-
ers Unbound: Immigrant Youth Mobilizing, 24 NEW LAB. F. 86, 86 (2015) (describing the 
DREAMers as “[o]ne of the most important social movements in the United States”); Rob 
Cameron, White Supremacy Created the Capitol Assault, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 11, 2021), https:// 
foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/11/white-supremacy-capitol-assault-trump-supporters [https:// 
perma.cc/4S4D-4NR3] (“[T]he modern conservative movements have always been a safe 
space for the privileges of white rage . . . . What happened on Capitol Hill was not an accident. 
It wasn’t an act of God. This wasn’t an aberration; it was part of a pattern.”); Stephanie Zacha-
rek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland Edwards, Person of the Year 2017: The Silence Break-
ers, TIME (Dec. 18, 2017), https://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silence-breakers 
[https://perma.cc/UC6M-8PEW] (discussing the advent of the #MeToo movement). 
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A. Comparative Subordination 
Comparative subordination scholarship notably treats disability and race as 
distinct categories. Ribet describes “comparative subordination” as scholarship 
that primarily “relies on analogy and application of racially based analysis to dis-
ability, interchanging disability as a category of oppression with race as a cate-
gory of oppression.”20 Adrienne Asch, according to Ribet, falls into this category 
because she “treats race and disability as relatively discrete categories, focusing 
on how the two compare, and in some moments degenerating into a debate 
about which oppression or experience is harder or worse.”21 The identifying fea-
ture of this category, irrespective of the identity gate one enters, is the treatment 
of disability and race as separate categories. 
Many foundational disability law-review articles adopted a comparative ap-
proach to race and disability, in part, because that was where the law was devel-
oping. For example, disability legal scholars like Ruth Colker and Sam Bagenstos 
have argued, a shift from individual conceptions of discrimination to a structural 
subordination approach allows for greater theorizing across categories and pos-
sibilities for coalition-building.22 In the 1990s and early 2000s, this position in 
legal scholarship tracked the goals of the disability-rights movement seeking to 
develop a broader socio-political disability identity.23 In fact, narratives of 
 
20. Ribet, supra note 17, at 209. 
21. Id.; see Adrienne Asch, Critical Race Theory, Feminism and Disability: Reflections on Social Justice 
and Personal Identity, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 391 (2001). 
22. Ruth Colker authored a series of highly influential articles making the move from individual 
rights to group anti-subordination efforts. See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A 
Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415 (2007); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination 
Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986) (theorizing across 
race and sex); Ruth Colker, The Anti-Subordination Principle: Applications, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L. 
J. 59 (1987) (distinguishing between anti-differentiation whose goal is assimilationist to ab-
sorb difference into existing norms and anti-subordination which is not opposed to difference 
unless it results in subordination of historically marginalized groups such as women and Black 
Americans); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. 
REV. 397 (2000) (arguing that “an understanding of disability as subordination . . . should 
frame the approach of courts in interpreting the statutory ‘disability’ definition”). I would 
count my own work in this category though my aesthetics article brought the need for inten-
tional engagement with race into view for me. I make note of future work to wrestle with 
questions of race and disability. This Essay is the beginning of that work. 
23. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as An-
tidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004) (rooting disability within the broader civil-
rights framework). 
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“sameness” among neatly packaged, protected classes may have helped move the 
Americans with Disabilities Act through Congress from bill to law.24 
Since 2010, legal scholars within disability law and equality law more broadly 
have further developed the comparative model. The legal scholarship largely falls 
into three subcategories under the comparative type:25 (1) Disability and Race; 
(2) Disability as Race; and (3) Race as Disability. I describe and offer an example 
of work in each category below. 
1. Disability and Race 
The scholarship in this category is largely consistent in form and focus as 
described previously; it compares race and disability discrimination in service of 
situating disability within the broader civil-rights paradigm and offering in-
sights about the disability “perspective” in the race context or vice versa. Mark 
Weber, for example, pinpoints critical comparisons and points of departure 
among disability, race, and sex discrimination laws.26 For instance, Weber de-
scribes that while animus drives discrimination in the race (and sex) context, 
animus does less work in the disability space. Attitudes about disability may be 
driven by a different emotion entirely such as by pity or benevolence. Therefore, 
disability law may require different designs than race and other areas of antidis-
crimination law.27 
Disability activists framed disability rights as an extension of the Civil Rights 
Act. They drew power, broad-based support, and issue legitimacy from cross-
movement analogies. However, there were some civil-rights leaders who, cogni-
zant of the discursive use of disability language as a tool of subordination to dis-
enfranchise Black people, rejected associations with disability and sought dis-
tance from an emerging disability-rights movement.28 Historical references to 
 
24. See generally LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENABLING ACTS: THE HIDDEN STORY OF HOW THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT GAVE THE LARGEST US MINORITY ITS RIGHTS 9-10 (2015) (emphasiz-
ing the deliberate adoption of a civil-rights frame for disability rights at least in part to make 
disability rights appear to be a simple extension of other civil-rights protections from the 1964 
Civil Rights Act). 
25. These subtypes are my addition to Ribet’s more general “comparative subordination” cate-
gory. 
26. Mark C. Weber, Intent in Disability Discrimination Law: Social Science Insights and Comparisons 
to Race and Sex Discrimination, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 151, 162. 
27. Id. at 167-68. 
28. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Brune, Blind Like Me: John Howard Griffin, Disability, Intersectionality, and 
Civil Rights in Postwar America, 50 AFR. AM. REV. 203, 215 (2017); Josh Lukin, Disability and 
Blackness, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 308, 309 (Lennard J. Davis. Ed., 4th ed., 2013) 
(quoting Black disabled activist, Johnnie Lacy) (“I believe that Black Americans see disability 
in the same way that everybody else sees it—[perceiving people with disabilities as] worthless, 
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race in disability emphasize the role of the Black Panthers in the San Francisco 
504 sit-ins in 1977—a formative moment in the disability-rights movement’s his-
tory.29 For more than three weeks, people with disabilities occupied the offices 
of the Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) to protest HEW 
Secretary Joseph Califano’s delay in issuing regulations to enforce section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibited recipients of federal dollars 
from discriminating on the basis of disability.30 Blind Black activist Donald Gal-
loway worked at the Center for Independent Living in the early 1970s. He de-
scribed the support Black leaders gave to disability-rights activists, particularly 
in the San Francisco Bay area. This included support from the Black Panther 
Party.31 
2. Disability as Race32 
Craig Konnoth advances an interesting descriptive and normative claim in 
his recent work.33 He describes a shift from social constructivism at the heart of 
 
mindless—without realizing that this is the same attitude held by others toward Black Amer-
icans. This belief, in effect cancels out the black identity they share with a disabled black per-
son, both socially and culturally, because the disability experience is not viewed in the same 
context as if one were only black, and not disabled. Because of this myopic view, I as a black 
disabled person could not share in the intellectual dialogue viewed as exclusive to black folk. 
In other words, I could be one or the other but not both.”). 
29. See FRED PELKA, WHAT WE HAVE DONE: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVE-
MENT 220-222; 268-74 (2012); JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORG-
ING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 67 (1993). 
30. Lukin, supra note 28, at 310. 
31. Id.; see also Susan Schweik, Lomax’s Matrix: Disability, Solidarity, and the Black Power of 504, 31 
DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2011) (arguing that the Black Panther Party did much more than 
“bring[] food” for the 504 protestors; they adopted a “‘frame extension’ from their previous 
struggles to the arena of disability rights protest,” in particular, because of Bradley Lomax, “a 
disabled Panther and a Panther disability rights/independent living movement leader”); Ei-
leen AJ Connelly, Overlooked No More: Brad Lomax, a Bridge Between Civil Rights Movements, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/obituaries/brad-lomax 
-overlooked.html [https://perma.cc/37JH-HWCH] (discussing Brad Lomax, a Black wheel-
chair user with multiple sclerosis, as a bridge between the Black Panther Party and the disa-
bility-rights movement in the 1970s and describing, for example, how, in 1975, Lomax ap-
proached Ed Roberts, the director of the Center for Independent Living in Berkeley and 
suggested that the Center for Independent Living join forces with the Black Panthers to assist 
disabled Black people in East Oakland). 
32. A more appropriate label for this section is “Medicalization” as Race. For purposes of conti-
nuity with the other section headers, however, I use “disability” in quotations. 
33. Craig Konnoth, Medicalization and the New Civil Rights, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1165, 1171 (2020). 
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civil rights to a proliferation of what he calls “medical civil rights,”34 or legal 
rights (and entitlements) that flow from one’s individual medical status.35 
Whereas disability and race scholars tend to reject (with good reason) medical 
diagnostic-driven approaches to rights given the troubled history of medicine as 
a means of pathologizing difference, Konnoth argues that this coercion is no dif-
ferent from the highly assimilationist antidiscrimination frameworks operating 
right now.36 He encourages us to embrace rather than shun medicalization be-
cause “problems framed as medical are relatively insulated from political tides,” 
problems such as poverty, food insecurity, lack of access to health insurance or 
care, or homelessness (issues that disproportionately affect people of color).37 In 
other words, framing racial-justice issues in medical terms (around specific di-
agnoses) offers, on balance, according to Konnoth, a fruitful direction for an al-
ready problematic body of civil-rights law. 
3. Race as Disability 
Kimani Paul-Emile has framed race as disability to draw on the remedial ben-
efits of disability antidiscrimination law to mitigate racial injustice.38 More spe-
cifically, Paul-Emile focuses her attention on Title II of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act as a tool for addressing discriminatory state action against Black 
people such as material inequities in education and policing practices like racial 
profiling and stop and frisk.39 Paul-Emile’s framing of blackness as disability em-
phasizes the ideological and remedial ineffectiveness of “race law,” or civil-rights 
laws and Supreme Court equal-protection jurisprudence focused on race. 40 She 
argues for greater use of disability law, not only remedially, but also ideologically 
 
34. Id. at 1171; see also Rabia Belt & Doron Dorfman, Reweighing Medical Civil Rights, 72 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 176, 177 (2020) (arguing that “[t]he advancement of the medical civil rights 
approach reflects the tension between the older model of disability advocacy and the newer 
disability rights activism”); Allison K. Hoffman, How Medicalization of Civil Rights Could Dis-
appoint, 72 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 165, 166 (2020) (responding to Konnoth’s article and argu-
ing that, on balance, the medicalized frame will cause more harm than good). 
35. Konnoth, supra note 33, at 1172. 
36. Id. at 1173-74. 
37. Id. at 1128, 1134-37. 
38. See Kimani Paul-Emile, Blackness as Disability?, 106 GEO. L.J. 293, 296 (2018) (“[B]lackness 
in the United States has an independent disabling effect distinct from the effects of socioeco-
nomic status . . . . Understanding blackness as disabling, however, brings to the fore a sur-
prising new approach to addressing discrimination and systemic inequality that has been hid-
ing in plain sight: disability laws.”). 
39. Id. at 297, 352-60. 
40. Id. at 293, 296. However, disability law is not without its flaws. 
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to “capture the historical meaning and contingencies of race in ways that race law 
does not allow.”41 
Importantly, this framework fits within the broader comparative subordina-
tion frame precisely because it too treats race and disability as distinct.42 Paul-
Emile’s argument is not that a disproportionate number of Black people are also 
people with disabilities who might meet the statutory definition and thus be en-
titled to disability legal remedies for discrimination under Title II. Instead, Paul-
Emile posits that Black people might argue that blackness itself meets the thresh-
old definition of disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act: “a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activi-
ties.”43 
Ann C. McGinley and Frank Rudy Cooper seek to expand the concept of in-
tersectionality to include race and disability by organizing the protected group 
around shared experiences of childhood trauma. They draw on P.P. v. Compton 
Unified School District (Compton case),44 to argue that cases seeking remedies for 
structural racial discrimination might reframe these cases as a disability cases.45 
The Compton case held that school districts had an affirmative responsibility to 
serve the majority students of color (57% Latinx, 40% Black, 1% Asian) in the 
community who were, as a group, subjected to “adverse childhood events” on 
the basis of violence, poverty, and social determinants of health that produced 
long-term trauma.46 Under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, for 
example, these students met the legal definition of “qualified individual with a 
disability” and, as a group, had standing to challenge Compton Unified School 
District’s (CUSD) failure to modify the curriculum and programming (and pro-
mote trauma-informed education) to meet the needs of the students.47 McGinley 
and Cooper seek a structural remedy for a harm that has led to extended trauma. 
 
41. Id. at 289-99. 
42. See Lukin, supra note 28, at 309 (quoting Black disabled activist, Johnnie Lacy) (“I also dis-
covered . . . that many African-Americans consider being black as having a disability, and so 
they didn’t really identify with disability as a disability but just as one other kind of inequality 
that black people had to deal with.”). 
43. Paul-Emile, supra note 38, at 328 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(1)(A) (2012)). Paul-Emile goes into greater detail in her paper connecting “blackness” 
to each element of the legal definition. Thereafter, she moves to the substantive discussion of 
whether Title II of the ADA could offer structural reforms when race law cannot. See id. at 331-
60. 
44. 135 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (C.D. Ca. 2015). 
45. See Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Intersectional Cohorts, Dis/ability, and Class, 47 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293, 297 (2020). 
46. Id. at 297-98. 
47. Id. at 306-07, 307 n.53. 
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They use the concept of “intersectional cohort” that would, according to their 
argument, advance group-based claims through class actions recognizing that 
the students of color in these communities are similarly situated and mutually 
affected by adverse childhood events, namely trauma.48 
While McGinley and Cooper deploy an intersectional lens to their analysis 
of trauma and race, their main engagement with disability studies and legal 
scholarship is to think of disability law as a remedy and a hook. In this sense, 
this type of scholarship may fall more squarely in the “race as disability” camp. 
B. Intersectionality49 
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s groundbreaking work on intersectionality unearthed 
critical voids in antidiscrimination law and policy related to race and gender.50 
Yet, but for a handful of exceptions, discussions of race and disability do not use 
a critical-intersectional lens to interrogate inequities or a central subject of legal 
 
48. Id. at 296, 304 (“Recognizing poor, Black or Latinx students in violence-torn urban environ-
ments as a class in cases like Compton is appropriate because of their shared self-identities and 
identity performances in response to their common attributed identities, especially given that 
their claim is backed by the science of ACEs.”). 
49. There are many areas of legal scholarship that apply a critical-race lens and discuss disability 
less directly including race and medicine in reproductive justice, eugenics, genetic discrimi-
nation, criminal law, and psychiatric disabilities. See MICHELE GOODWIN, POLICING THE 
WOMB: INVISIBLE WOMEN AND THE CRIMINALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD (2020); DOROTHY 
ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011) [hereinafter ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION]; DOROTHY 
ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 
(1997); Camille A. Nelson, Frontlines: Policing at the Nexus of Race and Mental Health, 43 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 615 (2016); Camille A. Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling Race: Policing 
Race and Mental Status, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1 (2010); Jennifer Pokempner & Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Poverty, Welfare Reform, and the Meaning of Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 425 (2001). 
50. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Cri-
tique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F.139 (1989) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex]; Kim-
berlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241(1991) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins]; 
see also Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 542 (arguing that “minority 
feminist legal scholar[s] . . . must document the material legal existences of minority women” 
and “explore their concrete problems and needs, many of which are invisible even to minority 
lawyers because of gender and class differences”); Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and Title 
VII: A Brief (Pre-)History, 95 B.U. L. REV. 713, 719 (2015) (“[O]ften spoken of the ‘twin im-
moralities’ of ‘Jim and Jane Crow,’ [Pauli Murray] theorized black women’s singular experi-
ence in language that anticipated the concept Crenshaw would term ‘intersectionality’ a quar-
ter-century later.”). 
reckoning with race and disability 
927 
inquiry.51 Crenshaw argued that our system of protected classifications artifi-
cially siloed a person’s identity such that one could be a woman or Black person 
but, at least categorically for antidiscrimination purposes, not both.52 Im-
portantly, Crenshaw surfaced a central insight, that intersectional discrimination 
operated independent of its components such that the experience of subordina-
tion could not simply be captured by any one classification. Intersectionality, in 
that vein, also became a tool to highlight the experiences of women of color who 
are not represented discretely in the discourse of either feminism or antiracism.53 
Crenshaw’s work “highlights the need to account for multiple grounds of iden-
tity when considering how the social world is constructed.”54 
Other scholars like Dorothy Roberts—an expert in race, gender, health law, 
and bioethics—have studied the construction of race through medicine.55 Rob-
erts directly challenges the use of race as natural biological division. Race, ac-
cording to Roberts, is an invention that justifies political inequality by pretend-
ing it is a natural, scientifically supported, division of human beings.56 Roberts 
critiques the emphasis on comparative subordination to the exclusion of inter-
sectionality: 
Disability rights discourse largely has failed to encompass racism, and 
anti-racism discourse largely has failed to encompass disability. The dis-
ability rights and civil rights movements are often compared as two sep-
arate struggles that run parallel to each other, rather than struggles that 
have constituents and issues in common, even as both people of color 
 
51. For one exception, see BLACKNESS AND DISABILITY: CRITICAL EXAMINATIONS AND CULTURAL 
INTERVENTIONS (Christopher M. Bell ed., 2011). Other literature on intersectionality in the 
context of gender and disability or disability and sexual identity has offered interesting paral-
lels and points of departure. See, e.g., ROBERT MCRUER & MICHAEL BÉRUBÉ, CRIP THEORY: 
CULTURAL SIGNS OF QUEERNESS AND DISABILITY (2006); ROBERT MCRUER, An Austerity of 
Representation; or, Crip/Queer Horizons: Disability and Dispossession, in CRIP TIMES: DISABILITY, 
GLOBALIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 55 (2018); Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Misfits: A Feminist 
Materialist Disability Concept, 26 HYPATIA 591 (2011). 
52. See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 50, at 139-40 (argu-
ing that some experience compounded subordination because they exist at the intersections 
of multiple marginalized identities). 
53. Id. 
54. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, supra note 50, at 1245. 
55. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Is Race-Based Medicine Good for Us?: African American Approaches 
to Race, Biomedicine, and Equality, 36 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 537 (2008). 
56. See ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION, supra note 49, at 4 (“Like citizenship, race is a political system 
that governs people by sorting them into social groupings based on invented biological de-
marcations. Race is not only interpreted according to invented rules, but, more important, 
race itself is an invented political grouping. Race . . . is a political category that has been dis-
guised as a biological one.”). 
the yale law journal forum June 30, 2021 
928 
and people with disabilities share a similar experience of marginalization 
and “othering” and even though there are people of color with disabili-
ties . . . .57 
Returning to Ribet’s work, she seeks to import disability studies into CRS to 
show how it can challenge and “dismantl[] White supremacy.”58 Ribet examines 
how race and disability are both concepts that are socially constructed. She also 
highlights the interconnectedness of race and disability by people who hold both 
identities.59 Disability and race are both channels through which “normalcy or 
ideal physicality” are funneled.60 Ribet, working from a disability-studies posi-
tion, asks why disabled people are marginalized in the first place, rather than 
solely analyzing why people of color are treated like disabled people.61 This move 
centers not only those people of color who may not have impairments but are 
treated like they do, but it also includes people of color with impairments and 
those with severe disabilities. 
Notably, much of the work on intersectionality in the context of race and 
disability has taken place in the realm of disability studies and not disability law. 
Yet disability legal scholars have begun to embrace intersectionality and, in do-
ing so, apply it selectively to discrete issues disproportionately affecting disabled 
people of color such as special education, policing, and prison abolition work. 
For example, disability studies scholars, Subini Ancy Annamma, David Con-
nor, and Beth Ferri coined the term “DisCrit” in 2013: a dual analysis of race and 
ability they apply to education.62 Annamma, Connor, and Ferri believe that rac-
ism and ableism work in ways that validate and reinforce each other, and for 
 
57. Dorothy Roberts & Sujatha Jesudason, Movement Intersectionality: The Case of Race, Gender, 
Disability, and Genetic Technologies, 10 DE BOIS REV.: SOC. SCI. RES. ON RACE 313, 317 (2013) 
(citing Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 49). 
58. Ribet, supra note 17, at 212. 
59. See id. at 211.This intersectionality approach is similar to that of Crenshaw. 
60. Id. at 212-13 (describing “White deviance” as being explained by disability while “the con-
structions of People of color are correspondingly synonymous with abnormalcy, dangerous 
deviance or (infectious) moral sickness,” all of which bleed into “disabled”). This idea is a part 
of my aesthetics theory explored in Part III, infra. 
61. See id. at 213. 
62. See Subini Ancy Annamma, David Connor & Beth Ferri., Dis/ability Critical Race Studies (Dis-
Crit): Theorizing at the Intersections of Race and Dis/ability, 16 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 1, 1, 4 
(2013) (acknowledging that recent scholars have taken more valuable intersectional ap-
proaches and identifying the following: “(1) anticategorical frameworks that insist on race, 
class, and gender as social constructs/fictions; (2) intracategorical frameworks that critique 
merely additive approaches to differences as layered stigmas; and (3) constitutive frameworks 
that describe the structural conditions within which social categories in the above models are 
constructed by (and intermeshed with) each other in specific historical contexts”). 
reckoning with race and disability 
929 
students of color, the two do not exist apart from each other.63 Similar to other 
intersectional thought leaders in disability studies, they use DisCrit as a lens to 
show how race and ability are “intertwined in terms of identity.”64 One of the 
tenets of DisCrit is that it “values multidimensional identities and troubles sin-
gular notions of identity such as race or dis/ability or class or gender or sexuality, 
and so on.”65 Furthermore, DisCrit scholars show that the tension that exists be-
tween disability studies and critical race theory comes from a longstanding his-
tory of treating Black Americans as disabled to justify denying the group rights—
a history that has caused Black Americans especially to push back against volun-
tarily identifying as disabled.66 
Other scholars use critical race theories to understand disability-specific is-
sues where people of color are more present. Brianne Dávila, for example, applies 
an intersectional lens to special education and Latinx students. “Disability,” she 
argues, “does not simply replace race . . . but represents a complex interplay of 
race and disability in the lives of Latina/o students in special education.”67 Ap-
plying intersectionality to data collection, Beth Ferri and David Connor com-
ment that data on “‘racial inequalities in special education’ . . . is not sufficiently 
disaggregated to fully tease out how the problem of overrepresentation impacts 
students differently across disability category, race, class, gender, and school con-
text.”68 In part, this tracks a general belief that race and ability overlap and pro-
vide a useful way for sorting students.69 
Collectively, these scholars link disability and race through the prevalence of 
disability within race (that is, race is the dominant lens),70 but also note that the 
 
63. See id. at 2-5. 
64. Id. at 8. 
65. Id. at 11. 
66. See id. at 18-21; see also Jamelia N. Morgan, Toward a DisCrit Approach to American Law, in 
DISCRIT EXPANDED: INQUIRIES, REVERBERATIONS & RUPTURES (Annamma, Connor, Ferri, et 
al. forthcoming 2021) (describing Annamma et al.’s work on intersectionality and advocating 
for its application to particular areas of law). 
67. Brianne Dávila, Critical Race Theory, Disability Microaggressions and Latina/o Student Experi-
ences in Special Education, 18 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 443, 454 (2014). 
68. Beth A. Ferri & David J. Connor, Special Education and the Subverting of Brown, 8 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 57, 61, 63 (2004). 
69. See id. at 63. 
70. Id. at 61-62 (“In fact, black students remain the most over-represented of all groups, especially 
in the more subjective disability categories of MR, ED, and LD (learning disability) in nearly 
every state.”). 
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relationship between the two is not absolute: “For example, racial disparities are 
not apparent in less subjective categories, such as blindness or deafness.”71 
Liat Ben-Moshe advances perhaps the most Crenshaw-consistent approach 
to disability-race intersectionality in legal scholarship right now. Ben-Moshe’s 
scholarship, like that of other scholars writing in the intersectional (race-disa-
bility) space, examines education as a site of critical analysis.72 Ben-Moshe ex-
plains the need for an intersectional analysis, in part, comes from the disability-
rights movement’s adoption of the civil-rights blueprint as a model for antidis-
crimination efforts.73 As a result, Ben-Moshe aligns her work with a growing 
disability-justice movement rooted in intersectionality.74 Ben-Moshe applies in-
tersectionality not only to education but also to family law75 and, most recently, 
 
71. Id. at 63. Amanda Merkwae also treats intersectionality as a gateway through which to enter 
the discussion of discipline of disabled students of color in school: “Compared with their 
White peers, Black students are ‘twice as likely to be identified as ED [emotionally disturbed] 
and 2.7 times as likely to be identified as CI [cognitively impaired]’ and Native American stu-
dents are ‘nearly twice as likely to be identified as SLD [specific learning disability] and 60% 
more likely to be identified as CI.’” Amanda Merkwae, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and 
the Conduct of School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 156 (2015) (quoting Amanda 
L. Sullivan & Aydin Bal, Disproportionality in Special Education: Effects of Individual and School 
Variables on Disability Risk, 79 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 475, 476 (2013)). The diagnoses might be 
valid, due to socioeconomic circumstances that impact brain development during an early age, 
or may be misapplied, due to race-based cultural or linguistic differences. Id. 
72. Liat Ben-Moshe & Sandy Magaña, An Introduction to Race, Gender, and Disability: Intersection-
ality, Disability Studies, and Families of Color, 2 WOMEN GENDER & FAMILIES COLOR 105, 107 
(2014) (referencing “the term ‘DisCrit’ to denote the need for connecting critical race theory 
with disability studies to highlight the interdependent, intersecting, and mutually constitu-
tive aspects of race and disability in education and beyond”); see also DISABILITY INCARCER-
ATED: IMPRISONMENT AND DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 165 (Liat Ben-
Moshe, Chair Chapman & Allison C. Carey, eds., 2014) (examining the ways in which disa-
bility and race operate in carceral spaces as mutually constitutive: prison is at once “detri-
mental for people with disabilities and responsible for creating new experiences of disabili-
ties”). 
73. Id. at 108; see Harris, supra note 13, at 916-31 (2019) (discussing “the logic of disability law” 
based on the civil-rights blueprint centering integration). 
74. SINS INVALID, SKIN, TOOTH, AND BONE: THE BASIS OF MOVEMENT IS OUR PEOPLE: A DISABIL-
ITY JUSTICE PRIMER 10-20 (2d ed. 2019) (discussing the origins of disability justice from the 
shortcomings of disability rights); see also id. at 68 (“Simultaneously, disability justice is ulti-
mately about re-imagining and reinventing all of our relationships with one another, as well 
as with our own bodyminds. It is about transforming the very material and psychic frame-
works that designate some bodies and minds as normative, valuable, and acceptable and oth-
ers as deviant, worthless, or dangerous.”). 
75. Id. at 108-09. Family law offers an interesting point of analysis because non-Western cultural 
approaches do not always align with the assumption that disabled people “should be inde-
pendent from their families” as opposed to the interdependence sometimes celebrated in 
“more collective[ist] cultures[s].” Id. 
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the carceral state (prisons and psychiatric hospitals).76 She posits that, like disa-
bility, race should be viewed as a fluid and changing construct not limited to 
color but also culture.77 Importantly, Ben-Moshe notes the lack of representation 
of race in disability scholarship while commenting that 
scholars performing intersectional analysis . . . may not choose to iden-
tify as disability studies scholars; they see these issues as part of their 
overall racial, cultural, and sometimes marginalized experiences—an ex-
ample of how disability identity is experienced in different ways by per-
sons with disabilities who are not white and middle class.78 
Other disability law scholars have started to wrestle with intersectionality in 
specific areas of disability law.79 First, Katherine Pérez argues that disability jus-
tice requires a union of critical race and disability studies.80 She offers an example 
of such union: the history exclusion of disabled people likely to become “public 
charges.” This disproportionately affects people with disabilities who may need 
access to economic or healthcare supports to work independently, making the 
regulation itself a self-fulfilling prophecy and grounds for exclusion.81 
Second, Jamelia Morgan, another disability law scholar—who, like Ben-
Moshe and Pérez, actively engages the tenets of disability justice—applies an in-
tersectional lens to policing. Morgan refers to “disability in public.”82 These the-
 
76. See LIAT BEN-MOSHE, supra note 72; DISABILITY INCARCERATED (Liat Ben-Moshe, Chris Chap-
man & Allison C. Carey, eds. 2014); Liat Ben-Moshe, Dis-epistemologies of Abolition, 26 CRITI-
CAL CRIMINOLOGY 345 (2018). 
77. Ben-Moshe & Magaña, supra note 72, at 110. 
78. Id. at 111; see also Ashmeet Kaur Oberoi, Fabricio Balcazar, Yolanda Suarez-Balcazar, F.L. Fred-
rik G. Langi & Valentina Lukyanova, Employment Outcomes Among African American and White 
Women with Disabilities: Examining the Inequalities, 3 WOMEN GENDER & FAMILIES COLOR 144 
(2015) (showing how white disabled women and black disabled women experience employ-
ment discrimination differently because of race). 
79. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Reproducing Dignity: Race, Disability, and Reproductive Controls, 54 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 200 (2020) (discussing the shared subordination of Black women and 
disabled women in reproductive justice—the right not to have a child, the right to have a child, 
and the right to parent that child). 
80. See, e.g., Katherine Pérez, A Critical Race and Disability Legal Studies Approach to Immigration 




82. Jamelia Morgan, Policing Under Disability Law, 73 STAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manu-
script at 13-23) (on file with author). 
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ories of policing non-normative bodies, behavior, and minds, however, are fun-
damentally aesthetic and affective theories of disability.83 That is, the social 
model of disability alone does not address the roots of why policing and officer 
training, for example, are unlikely to make meaningful dents in sedimented bi-
ases that have shaped law-enforcement institutions from their onset. In fact, as 
I have argued elsewhere, while the social model of disability underwrites disa-
bility antidiscrimination statutes, at least aspirationally, it does not explain the 
aesthetic-affective responses people experience in the presence of race and disa-
bility and, therefore, is incomplete as a descriptive or normative approach.84 
i i .  evaluating current approaches to race and disability 
Part II analyzes existing approaches to race and disability in three steps. First, 
I synthesize the current literature and extract three key lessons in the aggregate. 
Second, I take these lessons and revisit Neli Latson’s story to illustrate their an-
alytical value and highlight the differences between the two meta-approaches 
(comparative subordination and intersectionality). Third, I identify three critical 
omissions in the current literature to facilitate the development of a more com-
prehensive intersectional approach to race and disability. 
A. From Comparative Subordination to Intersectionality 
Overall, the comparative subordination literature on race and disability takes 
as its starting point existing antidiscrimination laws and seeks to maximize its 
utility. For example, the disability and race subcategory maintains existing siloes 
in law—codified in statutes or common law as protected classes. Scholars com-
pare disability with race and gender discrimination to illustrate the structural 
and institutional roots across areas. The goal of this type of scholarship is to mine 
individual classes—race, gender, disability, sexuality—for similarities that can be 
used to cross-pollinate and generate remedial theories—such as anti-subordina-
tion—to unite protected classes within existing doctrinal constraints. 
Comparative subcategories such as disability as race further entrench medical 
frames historically used to marginalize racially disfavored groups. Scholars in 
this camp encourage the use of medical frames, in part, to access public benefits 
and social supports to mitigate the effects of structural racism on communities 
of color. Over one million Black Americans, for example, reside within a half mile 
 
83. Harris, supra note 13, at 945-46 (offering policing as an ideal example of where race and disa-
bility intersect to create aesthetic-affective discrimination) and 950-63 (reframing disability 
discrimination in aesthetic-affective terms). 
84. See infra Part III (discussing the benefits of aesthetic theories). 
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of natural gas facilities and, the toxic emissions from those facilities place them 
at higher risks of cancer.85 Rates of asthma are also high in Black communities;86 
in fact, one study by the Clean Air Task Force and the NAACP found that Black 
children in these communities experience 138,000 asthma attacks, translating 
into roughly 101,000 lost school days each year.87 The harm itself is the existence 
of disability in this subcategory; in the example above, the harm is asthma 
among Black children. Asthma diagnoses, therefore, may offer families of chil-
dren with asthma greater access to scarce economic supports or public benefits 
such as Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or monthly cash assistance, as well 
as, in some states, simultaneous access to Medicaid as health insurance.88 Race, 
however, continues to be the dominant lens to define the problem (i.e., how do 
we solve the problem of race discrimination) and “disability” (more accurately 
medical diagnosis), a means to an end. As a result, this utilitarian approach 
rooted in welfare law does not recognize or advance disability as a valued socio-
political identity axis. 
By contrast, the race as disability comparative subcategory recognizes the lim-
itations of the current antidiscrimination framework for race discrimination and 
seeks to reframe the harm. Unlike the previous framework (disability as race), 
however, this approach emphasizes the role of disability civil-rights laws, specif-
ically, rather than public welfare as remedies for race discrimination. Reasonable 
accommodations and the removal of access barriers become ways to mitigate race 
discrimination, under this approach, particularly in the context of public pro-
grams and services such as carceral spaces (jails, prisons, detention centers) and 
education. 
Intersectionality takes one major step that distinguishes it from the scholar-
ship in the comparative subordination category: both race and disability operate 
as constructed identities and mutually reinforcing elements for critical reflection. 
This scholarship, however, while developing within specific issue areas, lacks a 
 
85. Lesley Fleischman & Marcus Franklin, Fumes Across the Fence-Line: The Health Impacts of Air 
Pollution from Oil & Gas Facilities on African American Communities, NAACP & CLEAN AIR TASK 
FORCE 4 (2017), https://www.catf.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/catf-rpt-naacp-4.21.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2KM6-XRMC]. 
86. “Approximately 13.4% of African American children have asthma (over 1.3 million), compared 
to 7.3% of white children.” Id. at 8. 
87. Id. at 4. 
88. See Understanding Supplemental Security Income SSI and Other Government Programs—2021 Edi-
tion, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-other-ussi.htm#:~:text=In 
%20most%20States%2C%20if%20you,for%20Medicaid%20with%20another%20agency 
[https://perma.cc/8PXV-7QYC] (“In most States, if you are an SSI recipient, you may be 
automatically eligible for Medicaid; an SSI application is also an application for Medicaid.”). 
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unifying theory of discrimination that captures the specific nature of the subor-
dination, its methods and forms, and, consequently, specific ways to address it.89 
B. Three Key Lessons from Existing Scholarship 
Three key lessons emerge from the current scholarship on race and disability. 
First, disability and race are more similar than dissimilar when understood in 
tandem. That is, both are socially constructed categories manipulated by state 
and private actors to maintain socio-political and economic power by framing 
both categories in the language of biological determinism. 
Second, legal scholars outside of disability law have increasingly reached for 
disability remedies in the absence of viable curative pathways in the existing 
civil-rights canon.90 These limitations are clear, yet selective deployment of dis-
ability law creates a tension between short term gains (receipt of benefits) and 
the negative effects of long-term framing (disability is an individual deficit and 
tragedy). For example, Rabia Belt and Doron Dorfman have argued that the 
“medicalization of civil rights” while perhaps fruitful for individuals seeking in-
come supports through access to welfare benefits, may, in the long-term, under-
mine broader normative gains of the disability movements (disability rights, dis-
ability justice) to move away from biological frames of disability.91 
Third, the emergence of Disability Justice as a movement and critical frame 
is a contemporary example of intersectionality.92 Organically grown from the ex-
periences of people with multiple marginalized identities, disability justice is a 
powerful antisubordination lens that “marks a point of departure rather than a 
destination.”93 That is, Disability Justice is a movement away from disability-
rights frames; it is about the process of reframing more than any one end prod-
uct. Much like intersectionality, therefore, the intentionality of centering histor-
ically marginalized voices itself is transformative, much more than any one static 
 
89. See infra Section II.C. 
90. BELT & DORFMAN, supra note 34, at 176 (“Disability law seems seductive. Despite the general 
parsimoniousness of U.S. welfare benefits, disabled people can receive tax breaks, financial 
payments, and health care. Disability accommodations and modifications oblige employers, 
government programs, and purveyors of public accommodations to provide remedies to the 
mismatch between people’s disabilities and their services and programs.”). 
91. Id. at 181. 
92. SINS INVALID, supra note 74, at 10-20 (discussing the origins and meanings of “disability jus-
tice” and its relationship to the disability-rights movement); see also Katie Eyer, Claiming Dis-
ability, 101 B.U. L. REV. 547, 570 n.157 (2021) and accompanying text (discussing the birth of 
Disability Justice as an alternative model). 
93. SINS INVALID, supra note 74, at 10. 
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by-product. The following Section returns to Neti Laton’s story to consider con-
temporary approaches and these three core lessons. 
C. Application of Existing Approaches to Neli Latson’s Experience 
How do existing approaches to race and disability help us understand Neli 
Latson’s experience? First, consider a comparative-subordination approach that, 
separately, applies a CRS lens and a critical disability lens. Using a CRS lens, we 
can see the structural racism operating throughout—from the phone call to the 
police that triggered the series of events to the lengthy sentence imposed and 
likely his treatment in the detention facility that relied on restraint and seclusion 
to control Latson.94 Documentation over the last few years highlights the dis-
proportionate impact “concerned citizens’” calls to police have on people of color, 
especially Black Americans, for “existing while Black.”95 Studies on the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion reveal that prosecutors—who also happen to be pre-
dominantly white96—disproportionately charge people of color for similar con-
duct relative to white people.97 The effects of systemic racism may also affect the 
 
94. See Marcus, supra note 1. 
95. See, e.g., Chan Tov MacNamarah, White Caller Crime: Racialized Police Communication and 
Existing While Black, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 335, 337-41 (2019) (cataloguing recent incidents of 
innocuous behavior by people of color that triggered phone calls to the police including “sit-
ting in Starbucks; playing golf; eating at a Waffle House; sleeping in university common 
rooms; eating in university class rooms; making purchases; returning purchases; smoking 
cigarettes; moving into apartments; leaving apartments; going for walks; doing their jobs; 
eating in restaurants; barbecuing; going to the gym; attending funerals; using too many or 
the wrong coupons; swimming in pools; playing basketball; canvassing for political reelec-
tion; doing community service; mowing the lawn; sheltering from the rain; getting into their 
cars; sitting in their cars; not listening to a neighbor’s problems; walking their dogs; wearing 
costumes; wearing a bandana; and selling bottled water on a hot summer’s day” (citations 
omitted)). 
96. See Katherine J. Bies, Darryl G. Long Jr., Megan S. McKoy, Jimmy S. Threatt & Joshua D. 
Wolf, Diversity in Prosecutors’ Offices: Views from the Front Line, STAN. CRIM. JUST. CTR. 8-9 
(2016), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Diversity-Case-Studies 
-Final-3.12.16.pdf [https://perma.cc/MRU4-CDAC] (discussing the racial composition of 
District Attorney Offices in California and showing that even when selecting for those offices 
with the largest percentages of non-white prosecutors, the range of white prosecutors was still 
between 53% and 81%). 
97. See Timothy Williams, Black People Are Charged at a Higher Rate than Whites. What if Prosecu-
tors Didn’t Know Their Race?, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2019/06/12/us/prosecutor-race-blind-charging.html [https://perma.cc/8YP4-J72C]. Wil-
liams describes the experience of Michael Smith, a twenty-three-year-old Black American 
man in the Bay Area. Smith was “riding a train in San Francisco when a white man told him 
that he smelled bad and should move away from him.” Id. The two men exchanged words and 
Smith, ultimately, was restrained by police officers who accused Smith of assaulting them. 
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length of the sentence imposed and how corrections officers interact with Latson 
relative to white detainees.98 For example, police and corrections officers may 
have perceived Latson’s behavior as unruly and insolent, motivating them to ex-
ercise control over Latson’s “non-compliant” Black body.99 
Applying a critical disability lens, we see other sources of subordination at 
work. First, Latson’s failure to give the officer his name when asked and subse-
quent flight, taken together, are common manifestations of a “fight or flight” 
response associated with people on the autism spectrum, particularly when they 
are afraid.100 Second, the state of Virginia appears to have denied Latson his right 
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act to be placed in the most 
integrated setting appropriate.101 Virginia’s Department of Behavioral Health 
and Disability Services offered to help the facility holding Latson determine 
what supports and modifications would be appropriate; however, “this offer was 
 
The District Attorney’s Office “charged Smith with seven counts, including battery on a police 
officer and resisting arrest.” Id. 
98. See, e.g., Written Submission on Racial Disparities in Sentencing, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Oct. 
27, 2014), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/141027_iachr_racial_disparities 
_aclu_submission_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/MQK5-ZJ2R] (“Sentences imposed on Black 
males in the federal system are nearly 20 percent longer than those imposed on white males 
convicted of similar crimes.”). While not specific to Virginia, the Commonwealth has recog-
nized the existence of disparate treatment in sentencing and, and Governor Northam assem-
bled a Commission to look at racial injustice in the criminal-justice system. See Press Release, 
Office of the Governor, Governor Northam Signs Executive Order Establishing Commission 
to Examine Racial Inequity in Virginia Law (June 4, 2019), https://www.governor.virginia 
.gov/newsroom/all-releases/2019/june/headline-840916-en.html [https://perma.cc/6DW5 
-X68C]; The Commission to Examine Racial Inequity in Virginia Law, Identifying and Ad-
dressing the Vestiges of Inequity and Inequality in Virginia Laws, GOVERNOR VA. (Nov. 15, 2020), 
https://www.governor.virginia.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/governor-of-virginia/pdf 
/2020-Commission-Report---Inequity-and-Inequality-in-Virginia-Law.pdf 
99. See David M. Perry & Lawrence Carter-Long, The Ruderman White Paper on Media Coverage of 
Law Enforcement Use of Force and Disability, RUDERMAN FAM. FOUND. 12, 14-15, 39 (2016), 
https://rudermanfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/MediaStudy-Police 
Disability_final-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9UN-Y5WD] (discussing Latson’s story and 
police response to “non-complaint” behavior by individuals with disabilities generally). 
100. See Marcus, supra note 1. 
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2018) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such en-
tity.”); 28 CFR § 35.130(d) (2021) (“A public entity shall administer services, programs, and 
activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with 
disabilities.”) (emphasis added); 28 CFR § 35, App. B (2021) (defining the “most integrated 
setting appropriate” as “a setting that enables individuals with disabilities to interact with 
nondisabled persons to the fullest extent possible”). 
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inexplicably refused” and, instead, the prison placed Latson in solitary confine-
ment, one of the most restrictive settings possible in the prison setting.102 Relat-
edly, the Department of Justice entered into an Olmstead settlement agreement 
with Virginia in 2012 to ensure that people with intellectual and developmental 
disabilities did not experience “unnecessary institutionalization” when less re-
strictive community-based placements might be more appropriate.103 
A comparative-subordination approach, therefore, analyzes Latson’s story 
through two separate lenses—critical race and disability—and then identifies 
what insights each critical lens offers into the discrimination experienced by 
Latson. But such an approach is unable to fully capture how Latson experiences 
the harm and how the different community and institutional actors in this story 
see him. Also, when we turn to remedies, a comparative-subordination approach 
falls short because current legal frameworks require disaggregation of the harms 
experienced by Latson.104 Latson, for example, may file a complaint in federal 
court under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act to address the 
Olmstead enforcement claims discussed above. He may file federal (and perhaps 
state) constitutional claims such as cruel and unusual punishment or failure to 
provide safety and minimal habilitation. He may have due process claims as well. 
The point is that it would be difficult to fully compartmentalize the harm and 
certainly none of the legal options available reflects his actual experience. 
Using an intersectional, disability-justice approach certainly helps locate the 
compounded harms experienced by Latson as an autistic Black man. Intersec-
tionalists might argue, for instance, that Latson’s blackness and disability place 
him at heightened risks for extreme treatment and marginalization. The fact that 
Latson was a tall Black male teenager at the time, much like Tamir Rice, likely 
affected how the officer responding to the community call perceived Latson’s 
manifestations of his autism.105 For example, fifty-five percent of disabled Black 
 
102. Northam Letter, supra note 2, at 2. 
103. Settlement Agreement at 3, United States v. Virginia, No. 3:12-cv-00059-JAG (E.D. Va. Jan. 
26), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/01/26/va-ada_settlement 
_1-26-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ6Z-9UD8]; see Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 
581, 597 (1999) (“Unjustified isolation, we hold, is properly regarded as discrimination based 
on disability.”). 
104. This legal analysis does not depend on damages, which would raise questions about sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 
105. See Finn Gardiner, Manuel Díaz & Lydia X. Z. Brown, Charles Kinsey’s Story Is About Race. It’s 
Also About Ableism, SOJOURNERS (July 27, 2016), https://sojo.net/articles/charles 
-kinseys-story-about-race-its-also-about-ableism [https://perma.cc/K4MP-NXW9]. 
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people are arrested by age twenty-eight, a risk that is compounded for Black dis-
abled men.106 Further disaggregation by disability shows that “people with au-
tism spectrum disorders are seven times more likely to interact with police over 
their lifetimes, compared with people without a cognitive disorder.”107 
Other research shows that police officers have a skewed perception of the 
criminality of young Black people relative to young white people.108 “[P]olice 
interactions are part of a broader set of social practices that reconstitute black 
boys so that they barely have currency as troubled teens, let alone children in 
need of protection. Rather, they are seen as putative black men—or black men in 
waiting—who deserve discipline, social control, and punishment.”109 
Similarly, a young Black man seated on the grass in front of a library in a 
white neighborhood may be about race, and the call by the community member 
may have tipped the first domino. However, Latson’s actions to withhold his 
name and flee—two behaviors more associated with disability than race—kept 
the dominos in motion. Consider “the talk” that Black mothers have with their 
Black children, in particular, Black boys, about interactions with police offic-
ers.110 “The precarious nature of police interactions forces Black parents to dis-
regard the age of their children and implore them to engage in self-monitoring 
behaviors (e.g., emotional regulation, image management) that are beyond their 
developmental purview.”111 Latson’s mother may have had a similar talk with 
 
106. Erin J. McCauley, The Cumulative Probability of Arrest by Age 28 Years in the United States by 
Disability Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Gender, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1977, 1980 (2017). 
107. Rebecca Hersher, For Parents of Young Black Men with Autism, Extra Fear About Police, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Aug. 23, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/08/23 
/342688183/for-parents-of-young-black-men-with-autism-extra-fear-about-police [https:// 
perma.cc/H8R9-78WW]. 
108. Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police Violence? 51 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. REV. 159, 172 (2016). 
109. Id. at 173. See also Jamelia Morgan, Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, 109 CALIF. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2021) (discussing the discriminatory effect of disorderly-conduct laws and the ways 
they are utilized to police behavior in ways that reinforce “racism, sexism, and ableism”). 
110. See Abril Harris & Ndidiamaka Amutah-Onukagha, Under the Radar: Strategies Used by Black 
Mothers to Prepare Their Sons for Potential Police Interactions, 45 J. BLACK PSYCH. 439, 440 (2019) 
(“The unique socialization process that occurs between Black mothers and their children in-
corporates learning about societal norms while accounting for implicit and explicit racism.”); 
Alicia Montgomery, Autism, Like Race, Complicates Almost Everything, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 
12, 2014), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/04/12/301814519/autism-like 
-race-complicates-almost-everything [https://perma.cc/2J6P-XTFS] (describing her experi-
ence as a Black mother of a Black son on the spectrum: “[T]here’s that fear—the one that I 
used to think only black parents really understood—that you could do everything right, spend 
every dime, minute, ounce of energy on your child, and it still might not be enough”). 
111. Harris & Amutah-Onukagha, supra note 110, at 441. 
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him about how he would be perceived and what to do. However, in the moment, 
under stress, his fight or flight impulse won out. 
D. What’s Missing? 
Existing analytical approaches to race and disability offer important insights 
into discrimination at the intersection of the two identity axes. However, we are 
missing some critical points of nuance. This nuance matters because we want to 
understand the nature of discrimination at the intersection, who it affects, and 
how it operates. Such a diagnostic assessment then best positions us to develop 
legal and policy solutions to respond to the structural issues driving the bus. A 
comparative-subordination lens captures only one form of subordination at a 
time (race or disability and how one can inform the other), one identity axis, to 
the exclusion of the other. Intersectionality, as currently constructed, while shift-
ing the analytical center to ask how race and disability together affect Latson’s 
experience, does not fully address three issues: people at the intersections, ten-
sions at the intersections, and the aftermath of intersectional discrimination. 
1. People at the Intersections 
Current approaches apply a one-dimensional approach to disability that 
does not account for the specific relationship people of color have to disability. 
We can think of the intersection of race and disability in at least three ways. First, 
states and private actors have used disability labels to subordinate people of color 
who have no impairment to maintain institutions and practices of white suprem-
acy. These are people of color without any actual physical or mental impairment 
who are nevertheless “regarded as” disabled and disenfranchised accordingly.112 
Second, disability can be a direct by-product of structural racism. Consider 
here the most literal forms of states creating impairments through wars, police 
violence, incarceration, as well as through the less direct but nonetheless power-
ful social determinants of health such as barriers to meaningful access to health 
care, education, employment, housing, wealth accumulation, and political 
power. Similarly, environmental justice concerns show the ways environmental 
hazards fall disproportionately on people of color, resulting in short- and long-
 
112. A particularly unique innovation of the ADA is the “regarded as” prong of the definition of 
disability. This offers a remedy for disability discrimination to people without disabilities or 
those whose disabilities do not meet the statutory definition of disability but who nonetheless 
experience discrimination based on a perception that the person is disabled. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12102(1)(C), (3)(A), (B) (2018). 
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term disability.113 The Flint, Michigan water crisis is such an example.114 People 
of color in this category may have a difficult relationship with disability. If a per-
son’s respiratory conditions, for example, can be traced to the failure of a land-
lord to remove asbestos, or intellectual disability can be traced to failure to re-
move lead-based paint, how do they negotiate their relationship with 
disability?115 
Third, and relatedly, race and disability can mean both. Some people of color 
are also disabled with chronic illnesses and impairments that may or may not 
need accommodation. These individuals may have different disability origin sto-
ries not necessarily tied to the social determinants of health. These differences 
matter, for example, for how the individual experiences harm and what legal 
remedies might make them whole if they experience individual or group dis-
crimination. From a movement perspective, these distinctions matter too with 
respect to whether individuals will embrace or reject disability identity (or some-
thing in between).116 
These three groups appear to be dissimilar at first according to their relation-
ship with disability (no impairment, congenital impairment that may or may not 
be a direct result of state violence and discrimination). However, understanding 
the connections and nuance allows us to identify the unifying thread—subordi-
nation and the social model of disability. The people regarded as disabled are 
labeled as such because of the historical association of blackness with disability 
and disability as an accepted proxy for incapacity or deficiency. A second category 
of disabled people of color may acquire disability because of structural inequities 
in the allocation of resources or, for example, poor housing located on or near 
environmental toxins. With respect to the third and overlapping category, peo-
 
113. See SINS INVALID, supra note 74, at 95 (“As survivors of environmental injury, we are planetary 
whistle blowers; we are the canaries in the coal mine that our planet is becoming after 500 
years of colonist destruction and capitalist expansion.”). 
114. See Michael Martinez, Flint, Michigan: Did Race and Poverty Factor into Water Crisis?, CNN 
(Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/26/us/flint-michigan-water-crisis-race 
-poverty/index.html [https://perma.cc/UX7Q-2AB2]; Vann R. Newkirk II, Trump’s EPA 
Concludes Environmental Racism Is Real, ATLANTIC (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www 
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/the-trump-administration-finds-that 
-environmental-racism-is-real/554315 [https://perma.cc/V7GB-Y9W7]. 
115. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and 
Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745 (2007) (challenging the conventional view in torts law that 
disability undermines one’s enjoyment in life and citing social science research to paint a dif-
ferent picture than the one advanced by plaintiffs’ lawyers in tort cases); Elizabeth F. Emens, 
Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383 (describing the discrepancy between the “outside” 
view of disability as a tragedy and the “inside” view that reflects the same levels of happiness 
that nondisabled people have). 
116. See Eyer, supra note 92, at 557, 567. 
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ple with disabilities, according to the social model, are disabled by society’s re-
sponses to their different capabilities. Integrating race and disability should not 
mean the elimination of one identity; that is, any intersectional theory must see 
both race and disability theories as critical to understanding what happens with 
multiply marginalized individuals and groups. While existing theories may ad-
vance the social model as a diagnostic or remedial lens, they do not capture how 
people’s relationships to disability (direct, familial, none, congenital, acquired) 
affect their willingness to engage with or claim disability as a socio-political 
identity. 
2. Tensions at the Intersections 
Conversations about disability among the three groups listed above—people 
of color without disabilities treated as disabled; people of color who become dis-
abled because of state action (or inaction), and disabled people of color with 
longer histories of disability (congenital, early acquisition)—are complicated by 
the difficult relationship between state subordination of people of color by and 
through disability as well as the use of state institutions—medicine, police, pris-
ons. 
For example, some parts of the civil-rights movement for racial justice who 
sought to portray Black people as “just like” White people, reached for public 
images to explicitly counter existing narratives of incapacity and incompe-
tence.117 Discussions of disability within communities of color, according to 
some activists, could undermine broader civil-rights advocacy and were to be 
avoided. For example, in 1986, Bob Kafka, the founder of American Disabled for 
Attendant Programs Today (ADAPT)118 requested assistance from legendary 
civil-rights icon, Rosa Parks, to lead ADAPT’s protest of Detroit’s Public Transit 
Association.119 The account of this story states that Rosa Parks declined the re-
quest because she did not want to “embarrass the black political establishment 
of her hometown, including Coleman Young, the city’s first African American 
mayor.”120 Another example of the tension between racial justice and disability 
relates to the political alignment with rhetorical libertarian and fiscal conserva-
tive positions that stressed the value of disability rights as moving people from 
 
117. See Lukin, supra note 28, at 312 (“[A]s postwar civil rights agitations grew, the stakes sur-
rounding public portrayals of blackness also increased.”). 
118. See ADAPT, https://adapt.org [https://perma.cc/GL6G-XVZL]. 
119. See Jennifer L. Erkulwater, How the Nation’s Largest Minority Became White: Race Politics and 
the Disability Rights Movement, 1970-1980, 30 J. POL’Y HIST. 367, 368 (2018). 
120. Id. 
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welfare rolls to financial independence.121 This discursive move, in some ways, 
pitted disability rights against those conversations in the late 1980s around Black 
Americans and welfare dependence that Congress would respond to with com-
prehensive welfare reforms in 1996.122 A third example, Black American novelist 
and activist, John Oliver Killens, tried to convince literary giant, Ralph Emerson, 
not to include Black, disabled veterans with psychiatric disabilities in his work 
precisely because of a fear of entrenchment of associations between disability and 
race.123 
Consider the ways disability sometimes operates within communities of 
color through the loss of actor Chadwick Boseman to colon cancer.124 The trib-
utes to Boseman poetically (and rightfully) honored his power, talent, and dig-
nity.125 Yet, they also almost consistently glorified (and noted)—as an example 
of this fortitude and dignity—his private battle to conquer his disability without 
public attention and without requesting assistance. He gracefully painted a vis-
ual homage to Black icons, Thurgood Marshall, Jackie Robinson, and Marvel 
Comics’ fictional King T’Challa (also known as the Black Panther), while pri-
vately managing chemotherapy and living with a chronic illness.126 This is not 
 
121. Id. at 369. This included watching “bi-partisan” coalitions form around disability rights while 
civil-rights laws narrowed in hostile courts and Congressional committees. Recall as well that 
many of the sponsors of the Americans with Disabilities Act were veterans and longstanding 
members of the Republican Party, like Bob Dole, with aggressive views on racial-justice initi-
atives. LENNARD J. DAVIS, ENABLING ACTS: THE HIDDEN STORY OF HOW THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT GAVE THE LARGEST U.S. MINORITY ITS RIGHTS 8, 100-114 (2015) (describing 
the bipartisan group of sponsors of the ADA); id. at 82 (quoting disability rights leader Justin 
Dart on the challenge of shrinking civil rights overall at the time when disability advocates 
worked to advance disability rights: “The day of civil rights is gone; there will never be an-
other civil rights law passed”). 
122. See Vanessa D. Johnson, Impact of Race and Welfare Reform on African American Single Mothers’ 
Access to Higher Education, 40 J. BLACK STUDS. 1041, 1041-42 (2010) (discussing stereotypes of 
Black Americans on welfare in the 1980s and 1996 welfare-reform legislation). 
123. Lukin, supra note, 28, at 312. 
124. Reggie Ugwu & Michael Levenson, ‘Black Panther’ Star Chadwick Boseman Dies of Cancer at 
43, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/28/movies/chadwick 
-boseman-dead.html [https://perma.cc/CXM3-UD7A]. 
125. See, e.g., Adrian Matejka, Variations on a Lead: For Chadwick Boseman, N.Y. TIMES, https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2020/09/04/movies/chadwick-boseman-adrian-matejka.html [https:// 
perma.cc/L8HL-8Q3S]; Barack Obama (@BarackObama), TWITTER (Aug. 29, 2020, 7:39 
AM), https://twitter.com/BarackObama/status/1299718379440398337 [https://perma.cc 
/5BED-CJTV] (“To be young, gifted, and Black; to use that power to give them heroes to look 
up to; to do it all while in pain—what a use of his years.”). 
126. See id. 
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to say that Boseman was required to disclose his chronic illness to anyone; rather, 
the operative question is whether Boseman had any choice in the matter.127 
Two important facts emerged after Boseman’s death. First, Chadwick Bose-
man was a Black man with a disability.128 Second, Boseman could not be Black 
and disabled and a superhero. It is hardly a stretch to say that had Boseman come 
to the table with an apparent disability (for example, if he were a wheelchair 
user), or disclosed a less apparent one, studios would likely have passed on mak-
ing him Hollywood’s leading man.129 
When news of Boseman’s death went viral on Twitter, a hostile debate en-
sued in response to a post by the Black Disability Collective that Chadwick Bose-
man was a Black man with a disability.130 Some people of color responded with 
contempt chastising the Black Collective and others for calling him “disabled,” a 
perceived slight to his strength and legacy. In response, the Black Disability Col-
lective tweeted: “So many of y’all hate disabled people so much that you’re deeply 
uncomfortable with Chadwick Boseman being referred to as disabled and his 
experiences being discussed through a disability lens. Cancer is a disability. Un-
pack your discomfort with this.”131 
This tension played out in the largely parallel development of the racial jus-
tice and disability-rights movements.132 The independent-living movement, for 
 
127. See Jasmine E. Harris, Taking Disability Public, 160 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manu-
script at 38-49) (on file with author) (arguing that existing privacy incentives in disability law 
and society undermine the broader normative shifts required to advance disability justice). 
128. Boseman’s colon cancer likely met the legal definition of disability under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act: “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2018); see U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CAN-
CER IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE ADA (May 15, 2013), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance 
/cancer-workplace-and-ada# [https://perma.cc/FC5M-JD9H] (“As a result of changes made 
by the ADAAA, people who currently have cancer, or have cancer that is in remission, should 
easily be found to have a disability within the meaning of the first part of the ADA’s definition 
of disability because they are substantially limited in the major life activity of normal cell 
growth or would be so limited if cancer currently in remission was to recur.”). 
129. Ari Saperstein, The Challenges of Being Disabled in Hollywood, WALL ST. J. MAG. (July 28, 2020) 
(discussing the existence of disability discrimination in Hollywood), https://www.wsj.com 
/articles/disabled-actors-hollywood-ada-30-11595939824 [https://perma.cc/F3WN-XFU4]. 
130. Black Collective (@BlackDisability), TWITTER (Aug. 28, 2020, 7:29 PM), https://twitter.com 
/BlackDisability/status/1299534563815948294 [https://perma.cc/N9AE-SFMP]. 
131. Black Collective (@BlackDisability), TWITTER (Aug. 28, 2020, 10:59 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/BlackDisability/status/1299587426231431173 [https://perma.cc/FNL9-EBFZ]. 
132. There were certainly important overlaps, in part, because people who participated in both 
movements shared both identities; however, for the most part, disability rights progressed as 
a “white” movement and was understood to be different from “race.” See Erkulwater, supra 
note 119, at 272-73 (“The [early campaigns of disability organizations in the 1930s through 
the 1950s] were waged largely, though not exclusively, by white men demanding access to a 
labor market where race dictated the jobs available, the working conditions, and the prevailing 
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example, made significant headways with white disabled people after its found-
ing in Berkeley, California, but had more trouble with outreach into Black Amer-
ican communities. Disabled Black activist, Johnnie Lacy has explained this diffi-
culty, in part, as a result of different cultural conceptions of community and what 
“independence” means.133 
3. The Aftermath of Intersectional Discrimination 
Consider the compounded effects of structural race and disability subordi-
nation on the opportunities available for people at the intersections after they 
experience the effects of structural discrimination in their lives. For example, in 
the case of Neli Latson, advocates successfully negotiated a conditional pardon 
in 2015 from former Virginia Governor, Terry McAuliffe and transferred him to 
a less restrictive setting, a stepdown program in Florida.134 On June 21, 2021, Neli 
Latson received a full pardon from Governor Ralph Northam.135 
Even with a full pardon, an apology, and access to ongoing community sup-
ports, Latson’s life will never be the same. According to Latson’s mother, Lisa 
Alexander: 
Every aspect of [Neli’s] life is supervised . . . . He’s not able to live in so-
ciety. He’s not able to get a job and have a girlfriend. He hasn’t had an 
opportunity to learn how to drive, to get a license. . . . These are rites of 
passage, natural progressions you get to experience as a human being. 
All of those things were stripped away from him.136  
Whereas Latson once showed potential for independent, community living, 
sources report that his continued trauma and fears make him more dependent 
on assistance from others.137 
 
wages.”). Tensions arose between the goals of the independent living movement calling for a 
move away from dependence on government benefits towards a rights-based model of self-
sufficiency and inclusion and the broader civil-rights movement for racial justice seeking to 
enhance public income supports. Id. at 273. 
133. Lukin, supra note 28, at 310. 
134. Northam Letter, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
135. Theresa Vargas, Neli Latson Is—Finally—Free. It Only Took 11 years, Two Governors and a Na-
tional Conversation About Race and Disability, WASH. POST (June 23, 2021, 4:23 PM EDT), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/neli-latson-black-autistic-free/2021/06/23 
/1024d4e4-d446-11eb-a53a-3b5450fdca7a_story.html [https://perma.cc/T43R-KGUZ]. 
136. Vargas, supra note 1. 
137. Id. 
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i i i .  toward an aesthetics of race and  disability 
Part III offers an aesthetics lens to give meaning and nuance to intersectional 
analyses about disability and race and further advance a disability-justice frame-
work. I build on my prior theoretical work around aesthetics, specifically, the 
importation of aesthetics theory into antidiscrimination law to help us under-
stand the nature and process of subordination because of disability.138 
A. Defining Aesthetics 
I have argued in other work that one of the reasons that disability norms have 
not shifted as Congress intended is that “[d]isability legal theories do not ac-
count for the ways in which the aesthetics of disability mediate rights and the in-
tegrative ideal.”139 The aesthetics of disability are those “visible sensory and be-
havioral markers that trigger particular aesthetic and affective judgments about 
marked individuals.”140 Contact theory—the core driver of law’s focus on inte-
gration as remedial—specifically, does not account for the ways that socially con-
structed markers of disability—for example, assistive devices like wheelchairs or 
canes, non-normative speech and behaviors141—trigger what I describe as an 
“aesthetic-affective” process that makes it difficult for nondisabled people to 
overcome deeply rooted and seemingly intuitive aesthetic judgments.142 
Aesthetics theories developed in the context of art and philosophy, two dis-
ciplines concerned, in part, with theorizing human embodiment. Classically fo-
cused on artworks, recognition of the beautiful and aspirations of the sublime, 
contemporary scholars of aesthetic theories—especially critical aesthetics and 
everyday aesthetics—challenge the notion of a single, universal standard of 
 
138. See Harris, supra note 13. 
139. Id. at 897. 
140. Harris, supra note 13, at 897 (“Disability rights law, like other areas of antidiscrimination law, 
relies on contact theory and its chosen prescription, integration. The contact hypothesis posits 
that increasing opportunities for interactions between diverse groups can, under the right 
conditions, foster greater acceptance.”). See also Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, All-
port’s Intergroup Hypothesis: Its History and Influence, in ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE: FIFTY 
YEARS AFTER ALLPORT 263-73 (John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick & Laurei A. Rudman eds., 2005) 
(discussing the evolution of Gordon Allport’s intergroup contact hypothesis in social psychol-
ogy, its preconditions, and its progeny). Allport opined that four positive features of inter-
group contact could reduce prejudice between groups: “(a) equal status between the groups, 
(b) common goals, (c) intergroup cooperation, and (d) the support of authorities, law or 
custom.” Id. at 264. 
141. See Harris, supra note 13, at 953-57 (offering a chart of examples of aesthetic markers of disa-
bility—both appearance-based and behavioral-based). 
142. Id. at 931. 
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beauty.143 They also confront the ways in which these standards developed by a 
few for a few, much in the way that critical legal scholars argue that the norma-
tive baseline underwriting law and its institutions was established by a few white 
men, for a few white men. On the disability front, aesthetics offer not only a 
space to question (and trace) existing norms of beauty but also how bodies func-
tion, perform, and move in the world, as well as which capabilities are privileged 
and why. The primary aesthetic values associated with disability are beauty, 
health, and effortlessness.144 
Aesthetic judgements about bodies145 can subordinate, oppress, or reinforce 
existing structures of hegemony. Attraction, repulsion, anger, and disgust are all 
ways of responding to bodies. The structural roots of what we see and feel in 
response to certain aesthetic markers reflect well-sedimented values. They serve 
“a disciplinary function.”146 Those unable to meet those standards are “con-
demned” and incur penalties in areas “unrelated to attractiveness: worse educa-
tion, parental care, and healthcare; diminished employment prospects and earn-
ings; harsher punishment in schools during childhood and in the criminal-
justice system in adulthood; and reduced likelihood of receiving needed help, 
among many others.”147 
B. The Benefits of Aesthetic Theories 
Aesthetic theories can help us unpack intersectional discrimination. A com-
parative-subordination lens remains useful to understand how concerns about 
preserving white control over power and wealth shaped the meaning of both race 
 
143. See, e.g., YURIKO SAITO, EVERYDAY AESTHETICS 11 (2007) (discussing the classic hierarchies 
that limit aesthetics to Western fine art or the experience of art more broadly while neglecting 
“other dimensions of our aesthetic life that we engage in almost daily, in forming preferences, 
judgments, design strategies, or courses of action”). Critical aesthetics question the classic 
normative focus of this interdisciplinary area on fine art with the goal of creating a sublime, 
though distant, relationship with a work of fine art. Everyday aesthetics is one type of critical 
aesthetic scholarship that shifts our attention to everyday experiences and objects. 
144. See Harris, supra note 13, at 959. Disability scholars such as Tobin Siebers and Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson have discussed the ways art and literature manifest aesthetic values such 
as beauty and health. See, e.g., TOBIN SIEBERS, DISABILITY AESTHETICS 1-20 (2010) (introduc-
ing and defining the concept of “disability aesthetics” as an “attempt to theorize the represen-
tation of disability in modern art . . . [a refusal] to recognize the representation of the healthy 
body—and its definition of harmony, integrity, and beauty—as the sole determination of the 
aesthetic.”); ROSEMARIE GARLAND THOMSON, EXTRAORDINARY BODIES: FIGURING PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY IN AMERICAN CULTURE AND LITERATURE (1997). 
145. By “body” I mean the physical, mental, and behavioral. 
146. Sherri Irvin, Introduction: Why Body Aesthetics?, in BODY AESTHETICS 1 (Sherri Irvin, ed. 2016). 
147. Id. at 1-2. 
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and disability. Segregation and invisibility in both the race and disability con-
texts were state sponsored attempts to move that which society deemed “ugly” 
or “disgusting” and hide it away to appease white fears. Law and legal institu-
tions adjudicated aesthetic markers and imposed penalties on those deviating 
from well-guarded norms. For example, early local ordinances known as the 
“ugly laws” regulated the visibility and movement of those bearing socially and 
politically disfavored marks—criminality, poverty, physical or mental disabili-
ties.148 Contemporary local ordinances149 regulating homelessness in public 
spaces share many of the same substantive goals of disciplining non-normative 
bodies and minds and protecting the public from discomfort and, perhaps, from 
triggering existential fears and dread.150 
Incorporating aesthetic theories into current discussions of intersectionality 
and disability justice adds to the literature in the following ways: 
1. Helps Us Understand the Aesthetic-Affective Process Taking Place 
Encounters with and interpretation of the body are central goals of disability 
studies. More accurately, disability studies interrogates the “idea of the 
norm . . . [as] less a condition of human nature than . . . a feature of a certain 
kind of society.” 151 How we perceive other bodies and minds—including which 
 
148. See SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC 3-5(2009). 
149. See No Safe Place: The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, NAT’L CTR. ON HOMELESS-
NESS & POVERTY 7-9 (2014), https://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/No_Safe 
_Place.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PCC-LEB] (describing laws that criminalize homelessness). 
In Santa Cruz, California, for example, the National Law Center on Homelessness and Pov-
erty reported that 83% of homeless people in the area lack shelter or housing options. Id. at 8. 
Yet, Santa Cruz has strict punitive codes that impose criminal and civil penalties for camping, 
lying down or sleeping in public places or vehicles. See SANTA CRUZ MUNICIPAL CODE, 
ch. 6.36, § 6.36.060 (“Any campsite established in the city in violation of this chapter is de-
clared to be a public nuisance, and the chief of police, . . . upon a determination that such a 
campsite constitutes an immediate threat to the health, safety or welfare of persons in the city, 
including persons using the campsite, is authorized and empowered to remove any such 
campsite forthwith.”). 
150. See Therí A. Pickens, Blue Blackness, Black Blueness: Making Sense of Blackness and Disability, 
50 AFR. AM. REV. 93, 98-99 (2017) (“It is a hallmark of disability experience that one is se-
questered away (often in institutions and private homes). This is of course a different kind of 
segregation from Jim Crow, but the two have an odd similarity in that they attempt to publicly 
erase instantiations of disability and blackness so that those who fear, dislike, or misunder-
stand them do not have to come into contact with them.”). 
151. Lennard J. Davis, Introduction: Normality, Power, and Culture, in DISABILITY STUDIES READER 1 
(Lennard J. Davis ed., 4th ed., 2013). Davis describes the shift from an Aristotelian focus on 
the ideal man to a statistically constructed “normal” man. Id. This emphasis on the natural 
existence of a “norm” implies that a majority of people should be part of the norm and, by 
definition, non-normative bodies of people with disabilities are deviations from a norm, and, 
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ones we notice152—are central questions of inquiry for critical race and disability 
studies scholars.153 Disability-studies scholar Rosemarie Garland Thomson’s 
conception of “staring” directly relates to critical aesthetician and philosopher, 
George Yancy’s “white gaze.” Yancy describes deeply rooted histories of struc-
tural discrimination baked into the acts of staring or white gazing as “a violent 
process . . . not an atomic or an inaugural event that captures, in an unmediated 
fashion, the bareness, as it were, of ‘objects.’”154 
Perceptions of whiteness as a universal norm set up not only blackness as 
nonnormative, but also disability. Yancy explains that deviance from whiteness, 
therefore, “the Black body as ersatz, aesthetically deformed, morally disabled 
(think here of the curse of Ham or Canaan), excessive, monstrous, disgusting, 
that is distasteful.”155 Whiteness, accordingly, creates the normative baseline by 
establishing proper mannerisms, comportment, acceptable aesthetic and emo-
tional responses to certain images and stimuli, triggers for images and emotions 
defining “threat” and danger, and even acceptable behavioral and sensory re-
sponses.156 Contrary to theories of scientific racism, “whiteness” is not a fixed 
experience but a “perceptual practice . . . that constructs the Black body as an 
object of disgust and fear” when, for example, a black person simply enters what 
are considered white spaces and “disrupt[s] the harmony and symmetry.” 157 
 
by extension, those who possess bodily differences are deviants. “An important consequence 
of the idea of the norm is that it divided the total population into standard and nonstandard 
subpopulations.” Id. at 3. This standardization offered a ready tool of disenfranchisement that 
connects disability with other historically marginalized groups such as Black, Indigenous, and 
Latinx people, immigrants, women, and sexual minorities. 
152. See GARLAND-THOMSON, supra note 144, at 6 (2009); id. at 18 (“Social expectations shape our 
ocular sorting processes, making certain appearances and actions unusual and cataloguing 
people as alien or native, extraordinary or ordinary. Zora Neale Hurston wrote, for instance, 
that she became ‘colored’ only when she was surrounded by white people.”). 
153. See, e.g., ROSEMARIE GARLAND-THOMSON, STARING: HOW WE LOOK 6 (2009) (describing 
“staring” as “[a] flare up when we glimpse people who look or act in ways that contradict our 
expectations.”); George Yancy, White Embodied Gazing, the Black Body as Disgust, and the Aes-
thetics of Un-Suturing, in BODY AESTHETICS 243 (Sherri Irvin, ed., 2016). 
154. Id. at 243. 
155. Id. at 245. 
156. Id. (defining the scope of proper reactions including: “the activation of sweat glands, breath-
ing patterns, heart rate, auditory and olfactory responses”). 
157. Irvin, supra note 146, at 8 (citation omitted). 
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2. Demonstrates the Role of Law in Defining Aesthetic Markers of Race and 
Disability as Tools of Subordination 
Laws have created and reinforced aesthetic markers of race and disability. 
Legal historians Ariela Gross and Alejandro de la Fuente discuss the ways that 
early colonists “created race through law.”158 This process of “[l]egal race mak-
ing,” as they describe it, was a distinctive feature of the evolution of slavery in 
the United States. “[T]he law constituted “‘blacks’ as social outcasts, conflating 
their social existence with enslavement” such that “blackness, rather than en-
slavement, [became] the mark of degradation,” and outlasted slavery.159 
Aesthetics allow us to understand compounded effects of racism and ableism 
and interdependence as diametrically opposed to “whiteness,” competition, and 
independence. The marks of blackness (and to some degree, race more broadly), 
at times, mapped onto disability and vice versa. “If, in the dominant culture’s 
vocabulary, blackness signified subhumanity, it also came to signify congenital 
‘disability,’ another form of “difference” that further marked black bodies for ex-
pulsion.”160 One example of law’s early construction of blackness as disability is 
military enlistment that prohibited “lunatics, idiots, and Negros.”161 “[I]t was 
imperative that the black body and the black ‘mind’ be portrayed as uninjured 
by the injuring institution of slavery in order to disprove one of the main an-
tiblack arguments that surfaced after emancipation—that slavery had made 
blacks ‘unfit’ for citizenship.”162 
State institutions and actors policed the line between whiteness and black-
ness through rhetorical and legal declarations of the biological differences and 
inferiority of Black people that made them unable to manage participation in 
democratic governance and civic duties. Medical and scientific “proof” then be-
came the means of marking people.163 Scientists and thought leaders at some of 
the nation’s top universities went to great lengths to make blackness a concrete, 
identifiable, and thus, biological category including dissecting black bodies and 
announcing such biological markers as cranial measurements proved Black peo-
ple had smaller skulls and, thus, lower intellect, poor moral barometers, and 
 
158. ALEJANDRO DE LA FUENTE & ARIELA GROSS, BECOMING FREE, BECOMING BLACK: RACE, FREE-
DOM, AND LAW IN CUBA, VIRGINIA, AND LOUISIANA 15 (2020). 
159. Id. at 15-16. 
160. JENNIFER C. JAMES, A FREEDOM BOUGHT WITH BLOOD: AFRICAN AMERICAN WAR LITERATURE 
FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 13 (2007). 
161. Lukin, supra note 28, at 311-12 (quoting JAMES, supra note 160, at 15). 
162. JAMES, supra note 160, at 15. 
163. See Erkulwater, supra note 119, at 371 (“Between 1880 and 1920, theories of scientific racism 
equated whiteness with physical fitness, mental rigor, and genetic superiority.”). 
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were “not of the same blood” as white people.164 “Whiteness,” therefore, became 
synonymous with health, “physical fitness, mental rigor, and genetic superior-
ity.”165 
These constructed markers of blackness—”constructed” in that they had no 
inherent meaning or value—became “legitimate” justifications for restrictions on 
access to public spaces, travel, as well as the denial of legal personhood.166 One 
interesting historical insight offered by de la Fuente and Gross is the framing of 
physiological and moral inferiority provided a seemingly “neutral” and fact-
based justification for slavery and close management of Black people. In this way, 
the arguments for slavery relied more on manufactured physiological differences 
than on politics or philanthropy.167 
Tying freedom of movement, economic livelihood, and socio-political par-
ticipation to race rather than status heightened the stakes for legal recognition as 
white (and able-bodied) identity as opposed to Black (or disabled) identity.168 
 
164. DE LA FUENTE & GROSS, supra note 158, at 178 (explaining the lengths white southerners went 
to show that Black people were “a different species, or that they had degenerated to such a 
degree that they were biologically different and hopelessly handicapped”); see also id. at 179-
80 (citing John Calhoun’s speech to Congress in 1837 where he claimed that there are “two 
races of different origin, and distinguished by color, and other physical differences, as well as 
intellectual are brought together”). 
165. Erkulwater, supra note 119, at 371. 
166. See, e.g., FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 129 (2012) (describing how race is not a biological marker or 
category, but rather a political category that has “staggering biological consequences” because 
of the effects of social inequality on health); IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING: 
THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA 3-4 (2016) (explaining scientific racism 
and biological determinism as the roots of segregationist and assimilationist ideologies); 
DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING 
OF LIBERTY 61 (2d ed. 2017) (“White Americans had for over two centuries developed an un-
derstanding of the races as biologically distinct groups, marked by inherited attributes of in-
feriority and superiority.”); THE TROUBLE WITH POST-BLACKNESS 15 (Houston A. Baker & K. 
Merinda Simmons, eds. 2017) (“My own conclusion is one that suggests there is no a priori 
blackness, no blackness removed or separate from the discourses—and imbedded interests—
naming it. When we think of code-switching and racial performativity as innocuous or objec-
tive terms used to describe certain actions within a universe of personal experience, we forget 
that all descriptions are situated and decidedly not neutral.”); Heather M. Kleider-Offutt, 
Alesha D. Bond & Shanna E. A. Hegerty, Black Stereotypical Features: When a Face Type Can 
Get You in Trouble, 26 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 28, 28 (2017) (discussing empirical 
research on stereotypical “Black faces” with a “combination of facial features including full 
lips, wide nose, dark eye color, coarse hair, and dark complexion”). 
167. DE LA FUENTE & GROSS, supra note 158, at 179 (internal citation omitted). In this vein, slavery 
was advanced as a positive good precisely because it offered structure and a path to “civiliza-
tion not ‘through a process of freedom’ but rather ‘through long periods of servitude.’” Id. at 
179. 
168. Id. at 178. 
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Self-identification did not matter in this story. It was about how courts and com-
munities perceived you. 
What evidence became relevant to and probative of whiteness or blackness 
in trials on racial identity? Aesthetics help us understand how courts and proce-
dural rules allowed people to move across the racial categories. In addition to the 
“biological” markers of race noted above, litigants relied on the performance of 
acts of citizenship—serving in a militia, as a witness, or on a jury; voting; or 
carrying a handgun—associated with whiteness as probative evidence of white 
racial identity.169 This move created a bright line between those who performed 
citizenship (and, thus, were racially “white”) and those who did (or could) not 
(and, thus, were racially “Black”). As a result, disabled people of color in this 
schematic offered two axes for civic exclusion—blackness and disability—which 
were mutually constitutive and reinforcing. 
Witnesses offered evidence of appearances and reputation, probative of 
white racial identity. Performing social acts of whiteness included Black men 
marrying white women; “associating with white people or black people on a so-
cial level;” “attending parties;” and even dancing.170 Notably, “[b]y deferring to 
juries, judges allowed evidence of racial performance to become as important to 
the definition of race as fractions of ancestry were in the statutory law.”171 
The probative value of the evidence of whiteness was highly gendered. While 
performances of citizenship lent credence to claims of “white manhood,” 
women’s whiteness relied on “sexual purity and moral character.”172 de la Fuente 
and Gross tell the story of two of the most widely followed racial-identity trials 
in New Orleans. Two women—Sally Miller and Alexina Morrison—claimed they 
were “white” and sued for their freedom. Despite a written record that might 
suggest otherwise, they claimed victory, in part, by advancing evidence of their 
markers as white women: “beauty, sexual purity, and moral character” such as 
industriousness and cooperation.173 Physiological evidence of racial differ-
ences—for example, eyes, teeth, or bone structure—could be countered success-
fully, as Alexina Morrison showed, with a proffer of association with white 
 
169. Id. at 203 (offering examples of identity performances intended to demonstrate one’s ‘white-
ness’); see also Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and 
the Right to Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1524-26 (2010) (describing how courts inter-
preted the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms as inapplicable to disfavored, marginalized 
populations and regulated the line between citizenship (white) and non-citizenship (non-
white)). 
170. DE LA FUENTE & GROSS, supra note 158, at 200-01, 207. 
171. Id. at 201. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 208. 
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women, including attendance at social events such as dances.174 The litigation of 
racial identity in Virginia and New Orleans, for example, “helped to constitute 
whiteness as a category of social superiority, inseparable from the privileges of 
citizenship and from gendered notions of purity, beauty, and propriety.”175 
3. Creates an Extralegal Means of Public Enforcement of Aesthetic Norms 
that Reinforces Structural Subordination 
Tying rights and privileges to specific identity categories (directly or indi-
rectly) can (and did) deputize the public to surveil and police non-normative 
Black and disabled bodies. Directly, local ordinances like the “ugly laws” em-
boldened private individuals to police non-normativity. Similarly, local ordi-
nances allowed private individuals to police blackness, in part, because of the 
association of “blackness” with slavery and disenfranchisement. This “empow-
ered whites to stop” Black people “at any time to verify that they were in posses-
sion of a written pass to be in the streets of New Orleans or on the ‘public 
roads.’”176 Stand your ground laws like the one in Florida that led George Zim-
merman to pursue Trayvon Martin are the progeny of these early ordinances and 
practices.177 Similarly, local ordinances that encourage private individuals to re-
port alleged abuses of disabled parking, for example, should be viewed in this 
light.178 
 
174. Id. at 209. 
175. Id. at 217-18. 
176. Id. at 35. 
177. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1) (2020) (“A person who is in a dwelling or residence in which 
the person has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground 
and use or threaten to use.”); Eyder Peralta, Trayvon Martin Killing Puts ‘Stand Your Ground’ 
Law in Spotlight, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Mar. 19, 2012), https://www.npr.org/sections 
/thetwo-way/2012/03/19/148937626/trayvon-martin-killing-puts-stand-your-ground-law 
-in-spotlight [https://perma.cc/GC3K-7S69]. See generally CAROLINA LIGHT, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICA’S LOVE AFFAIR WITH LETHAL SELF-DEFENSE (2017) (explaining the history of stand 
your ground laws and the role race played). 
178. See, e.g., Disabled Placard Abuse, CITY SACRAMENTO, https://www.cityofsacramento.org 
/Public-Works/Parking-Services/Disabled-Person-Parking/Placard-Abuse [https://perma 
.cc/X2QU-JAKY] (“To help reduce the misuse of disabled placards, the Sacramento Task 
Force On Placard ABUSE (STOP ABUSE) was formed on November 12, 1996. STOP ABUSE 
consists of specially trained Parking Enforcement Officers who investigate complaints on dis-
abled placard abuse and issue misdemeanor citations of the California Vehicle Code when 
necessary. . . . If you feel someone is misusing a disabled placard, or if you have any infor-
mation regarding DP placard abuse, you may contact one of the following agencies.”). 
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4. Helps Explain the Longevity and Resistance to Change of Racism and 
Ableism but Also Offers Remedial Paths Forward 
The deep aesthetic and emotional responses suggest that the normative shifts 
sought by antidiscrimination laws may be more difficult than social-justice pro-
ponents understand. Intersectionality locates the harm at the intersection, the 
person who is both a person of color and disabled. Aesthetics help us understand 
why, how deep this discrimination runs, what exclusion and reactions might 
look like at those intersections and then how to think about meaningful reme-
dies. 
One practical implication of aesthetics research is to challenge the effective-
ness of “awareness” and “training” prescriptions that do not adjust for aesthetic 
and affective biases. For example, in the context of police reforms to promote 
racial and disability justice, Devon Carbado and Patrick Block describe a cyclical 
feedback dynamic such that increased contact or exposure to Black men and 
awareness of biases may actually reinforce assumptions of Black men as danger-
ous and “render black boys less cognizable as youth.”179 
Aesthetics scholars suggest that attention to aesthetic-affective processes can 
promote change. George Yancy, for example, describes a process of “suturing” 
and “un-suturing”: 
Because white people collectively engage in habituated embodied white 
racist practices that are mutually reinforcing within the context of socially 
quotidian spaces, and that are further supported by deeply ingrained and 
sedimented historical, institutional structures, the assumption that white 
people can engage in practices of un-suturing solely through the act of 
intention, as one might change his/her clothes at will, is misleading.180 
Un-suturing, then, is not easy, automatic or magical, but, instead, requires 
“‘the active repetition of acts, verbal and nonverbal, that continues to communi-
cate’ the responsibility to engage opportunity for creating fissures in the system, 
disruptions in one’s mode of being white.”181 
Because disability is often understood as an aesthetic disruption when it is 
“visible”182 or intentionally made hyper-visible through performance, disability 
itself can create the conditions for un-suturing described by George Yancy, the 
kind required to disrupt the fraught status quo. This is yet another reason to 
 
179. Devon W. Carbado & Patrick Rock, What Exposes African Americans to Police Violence? 51 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. REV. 159, 173 (2016) (citation omitted). 
180. Yancy, supra note 153, at 257. 
181. Id. at 257 (citation omitted). 
182. Tobin Siebers, In/ Visible, in BODY AESTHETICS 141-42 (Sherri Irvin, ed. 2016). 
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center and move out of the way for disabled people of color, in particular, disa-
bled women of color to generate not basic cognitive dissonance that can be swept 
away, but an aesthetic-affective process that offers an opportunity to grapple 
with and un-suture ties to white, ableist histories and institutions. 
A.W. Eaton offers a non-legal intervention to change the aesthetic-affective 
process triggered by non-normativity. She argues that “resistance to fat oppres-
sion” in society, for example, can take shape in the “Aristotelian strategy of alter-
ing bodily taste through the skillful selection and use of representations”—quite 
literally diverse images in media but also representations in places of power.183 
“[T]he strategy of consciously altering the kinds of representations consumed 
by an individual or a society can be extended to other forms of appearance-re-
lated oppression based in race, disability, age, gender identity and other visible 
markers of ‘difference.’”184 
C. Application of Aesthetics 
1. Debunking Police Training as a Panacea for Police Violence 
There are well-known incidents of police violence against people of color 
who also are people with disabilities—for example, Sandra Bland was a person 
with psychiatric disability.185 However, police do not see the disability; rather, 
police only see a Black or brown body and its movements as threats through the 
lens of race. Officers, trained and equipped to enforce compliance,186 have a dis-
torted view of the situation because they have mistakenly applied a flawed lens 
to the person’s behavior. Yet media reports continue to discuss police shootings 
of people of color with disabilities through the singular lens of race. 
 
183. Irvin, supra note 146, at 3 (describing Eaton’s work); see A.W. Eaton, Taste in Bodies and Fat 
Oppression, in BODY AESTHETICS 48-53 (Sherri Irvin, ed. 2016). 
184. Irvin, supra note 146, at 3. 
185. See Perry & Carter-Long, supra note 99, at 7 (noting that police departments were not required 
before 2014 to report voluntarily on killings, so the authors collected data based on public 
news stories, available public records, and other sources); see also Kate Masters, Police Kill Far 
More People with Guns than Key Federal Data Sources Show, TRACE (Jan. 17, 2021), https:// 
www.thetrace.org/2016/03/police-fatal-shootings-federal-data-fbi-cdc [https://perma.cc 
/6K4Q-7CEZ] (discussing problems in collecting data from federal sources about the police’s 
use of fatal force). 
186. See Ibram X. Kendi, Compliance Will Not Save Me, ATLANTIC (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www 
.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/04/compliance-will-not-save-my-body/618637 
[https://perma.cc/6ZW7-86RM] (rejecting the notion that greater compliance with police 
by people of color will resolve or at least mitigate the violence). 
reckoning with race and disability 
955 
I want to return to Neli Latson. Aesthetics offer at least two unique insights 
here. First, research on associations between dangerousness and Black men sug-
gests that the “faces of black men attract more visual attention from white re-
spondents than comparable faces of white men” even when those Black men’s 
faces are neutral without showing signs of anger.187 Carbado and Block draw the 
following conclusion from these studies: “a black man who is providing literally 
no evidence of threat is nonetheless likely to attract the attention of police offic-
ers, so ingrained are the stereotypes linking him with threat.”188 When the com-
munity member called the police to report Neli Latson, the person noted that he 
might have a gun (something ultimately shown to be false).189 This person and 
the officer who responded may have looked at Neli sitting on the grass and no-
ticed he was in a predominantly white neighborhood, which may have triggered 
aesthetic associations of disgust and threat; they responded accordingly. Because 
Neli Latson did not show the aesthetic markers of disability in an obvious way, 
the dominant frame of reference was race.190 
Second, debates about the proper legal and policy solution for police violence 
are front and center. Some who wish to adopt a more reformist approach to ad-
dress police violence tout training as an important point of intervention. The 
aesthetics literature discussed above cautions against a traditional transfer of in-
formation as a fix. Would better training have spared Neli Latson from harm? 
Not necessarily—at least not in the current format. One idea for meaningful 
training for those who adopt this position that actively engages aesthetic and 
affective dimensions of race and disability may be the use of technology like vir-
tual reality. This can simulate (or recreate) past encounters between police and 
communities of color, disability, and those at the intersection and, as a result, 
trigger sensory and cognitive aspects of observation and action.191 Only a hand-
ful of police departments have started to experiment with virtual reality in their 
 
187. Carbado & Rock, supra note 179, at 168-69. 
188. Id. at 169. 
189. See Vargas, supra note 1. 
190. Of course, the behavioral response of “fight or flight” is very common among autistic people 
but was not recognized. 
191. I am not adopting a position on the abolition/reformist continuum. Rather, for those advo-
cating training, I invoke the aesthetics literature to show that most training out there today is 
not going to be effective because it fails to engage the emotional reactions. 
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training, 192 but theses trainings appear to be designed to address biases on the 
basis of race or disability (like autism or psychiatric disabilities) but not both.193 
2. Intersectional Race and Disability Discrimination in Employment 
Aesthetics theories also help us better understand intersectional discrimina-
tion in other areas such as employment. Consider workplace appearance or 
grooming codes.194 In Cleveland C. v. Department of Defense, complainants, Black 
men, worked for the Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA) and had pseudo-
folliculitis barbae (PB), a skin condition caused by shaving which is more com-
mon among Black men because of their curly hair.195 One way to manage this 
condition is to keep a short beard rather than to regularly shave. PFPA had a no 
facial hair policy; they previously granted medical waivers but then suddenly 
stopped granting such waivers citing concerns about complainants’ abilities to 
use respirators with their beards even though they never faced an emergency 
when they needed respirators and they “all passed standard respirator fit tests 
with short beards.”196 Complainants then requested a reasonable accommoda-
tion but PFPA denied their requests categorically without conducting individu-
alized assessments.197 
Pre-2008 Amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADAAA), 
plaintiffs alleging discrimination on the basis of PB did not succeed in court and 
post-2008, there were no EEOC decisions about PB and disability discrimination 
under the ADAAA.198 To fully understand the nature of the harm experienced by 
the complainants, we need to apply an intersectional lens that shows why they 
faced both race and disability discrimination as Black men with PB subjected to 
 
192. Emma Tucker, Ryan Young & Julia Jones, With Virtual Reality Police Training, Sacramento Tries 
to ‘Get to a Much Better Place,’ CNN (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/27/us 
/virtual-reality-police-training-sacramento/index.html [https://perma.cc/P5TT-RZ8J]. 
193. Alex Pasternack, VR Is Training Cops to Empathize with the People They Might Kill, FAST COM-
PANY (June 17, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90353647/police-virtual-reality 
-empathy-training-mental-health [https://perma.cc/45DK-22Q4]. 
194. See, e.g., Mayeri, supra note 50, at 730 (discussing how intersectionality works in employment 
and its roots). 
195. Cleveland C. v. Dep’t. of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 0120170405-0120170414 (2017); see Develop-
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grooming codes based on white men’s facial hair. Grooming codes are rooted in 
aesthetic norms that privilege whiteness.199 
conclusion 
The growing body of scholarship focused on race and disability signals a new 
direction for critical legal scholarship. This intersectionality revolution has only 
scratched the surface in disability law and requires further theorizing. This Essay 
begins a broader scholarly agenda in this arena. Aesthetics theories of discrimi-
nation offer a useful lens to wrestle with both race and disability as a common 
point of analysis and as a diagnostic lens to understand how society has con-
structed disability and racial markers and has used them against the other. 
I want to share one concluding question, the answers to which can further 
advance critical race and disability justice: how do we track race-disability (and 
other axes of) intersectionality in law? Disability data are hard to come by, in 
part, because of an association of disability with medical data and, thus, health 
privacy laws.200 The need for intersectional public data collection and dissemi-
nation could not be more important. Racial and disability justice are at the fore-
front of the major issues of the day—police violence, coronavirus, access to 
healthcare, gig employment, and living wages. Calls for standardized intersec-
tional data collection remain largely unheeded, but the regular collection and 
public dissemination creates opportunities for future research and public ac-
countability in policing, healthcare, and employment.201 
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